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Edsel Murphy is the only philosopher ever to have metaphysically
accounted for the occurrence of bankruptcies. Admittedly, his famous
First Law 1 is nonspecific. It covers all of life's misunderstandings,
misfortunes and failures. Murphian thinkers have nevertheless always
recognized that bankruptcies were among the distinct disasters Murphy had implicitly predicted and explained. Ironically, no lawyer,
judge, or scholar of bankruptcy law has ever made that same short
deductive leap.
Murphy taught that if we fail to understand failure, we fail to understand. Our profession has ignored his teaching and fallen into that
trap. Bankruptcy scholars lack any systematic theory which explains
the behavior of people in trouble. (Indeed, given our disregard of
Murphian philosophy, it is doubtful whether the development of such
a theory could ever have been possible.) We don't even have any empirical information about how failing debtors behave.
All we do know is that baajcruptcy is not working as a creditors'
remedy. General creditors don't get paid by bankrupts. 2 Murphy's
1. Murphy's Law is so well known that it seems pedantic to footnote its content. Neverthe·
less, the Law itself suggests that if it is important for a person to know it, that person might not.
I will, therefore, restate it here. Murphy's Law (in its weaker formulation) holds that Whate••er
can go wrong, will A stronger version has been derived from Sullivan's Co-Proposition which
states that "Murphy was an optimist." This has been taken to mean, when restated in rigorous
form, that the basic law is subject to the condition that Nearly everything can go wrong yielding
the so-called strong version of the law which can be simplified as "Nearly everything will go
wrong." This paper takes no position on whether the weaker or stronger version best reflects
empirical reality.
2. See, e.g., Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269 (1970)
(concluding, from extensive personal inquiries with bankruptcy practitioners and judges, that
general creditors don't get paid much by bankrupts). Murphians were generally unsurprised to
learn this and, on the whole, felt that had Professor Countryman really understood what Murphy
was saying, he could have saved himself a bundle of work. Others have worked even harder to
establish that same fact, however. See, e.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROB·
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Law foretells that neither theoretical voids nor lack of information will
inhibit experts from expressing opinions. Predictably, bankruptcy
scholars assume that the "problem" of zero collections in bankruptcies
can somehow be cured by clever tinkering with bankruptcy law. 3
This study departs from that tinkering tradition. One of its conclusions springs directly from an early corollary of Murphy's Law,
Seamus O'Reilly's Irrelevance of Repair Rule ("Attempts to fix things
are not only doomed but also meaningless"). The logic linking Murphy's Law to O'Reilly's Rule is straightforward: if things cannot ever
be made to perform as they were intended to, it is futile to try to repair
them. I show below why bankruptcy law can never be made to work
LEM, PROCESS, REFORM 88, 127, 130 (1971) (reporting that while, in most cases, unsecured
creditors received nothing, general creditors in personal bankruptcies received an average of 7%
of their proved and allowed claims; creditors of business bankrupts received an average of 8%);
T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CoNSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 199-229 (1989); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Folklore
and Facts: A Preliminary Report From the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.
293 (1986) (reporting the likelihood, based on an extensive empirical study, that consumer bankrupts have few distributable assets by the time they are in bankruptcy);' Buckley, The Bankruptcy
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1411 (1986) (reporting on a similar 1968 Canadian study
showing the average unsecured creditor in a Canadian bankruptcy recovered less than 6%); Herbert & Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-87, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 303, 311 (1988) (reporting
that nothing is distributed to creditors in 96% of all cases studied); LoPucki, The Debtor in Full
Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Parts 1 & 2, 51 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 99, 247 (1983) (reporting similar results from a study of Chapter 11 filings in one
district).
3. See, e.g., LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 311, 363-65 (assuming that if bankruptcies occurred sooner, creditors
would get paid more, and proposing that bounties be paid to creditors to encourage them to
initiate early proceedings). Since most bankruptcies are consumer bankruptcies and, therefore,
most of the unpaid creditors in bankruptcies are creditors of consumers, a lot of the heat has
focused on proposals to deny discharges to consumer debtors by various revisions of the current
law. See Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 89
for a comprehensive review of this extensive literature.
Not all writers proposing to modify the Bankruptcy Code (Code) to treat unsecured creditors
better in bankruptcies specifically rest their arguments on the fact that those creditors now receive nothing. See, e.g., Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and ToxicWaste Cleanup, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 119 (current creditors could collect
more if only they could liquidate the debtor's assets free of servitudes); Countryman, The Concept ofa Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 772-76, 813-16 (1985) (criticizing the exemption from preference attack of payments made in the ordinary course of
business, and of a similar exemption for small preferences by consumer debtors, because those
exemptions violate the equal treatment policy); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REv. 953, 992-97 (1981) (arguing that pre-filing conversions of nonexempt property
into exempt property ought to be avoidable, for similar reasons). Even so, such proposals implicitly assume that the unsecured creditors must not already be receiving favorable enough treatment. Otherwise the recommended tinkering would not be worth fiddling with. Not all the
proposed tinkering is intended to make the unpaid unsecured creditors better off, of course. See,
e.g., Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984) (arguing that existing interpretations of the Code's automatic
stay provisions tend to disfavor unduly secured creditors).
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as it is supposed to and can never be fixed. 4 It follows that tinkering is
a waste of time.
The Murphian argument does not stop there, however. Another
corollary, O'Shaunessey's Irony, holds "It is good that remedies don't
succeed." Attempted repairs are often worse than wasteful. They can
also be retrogressive. Bankruptcy law is itself an attempt to correct
previous conditions that made unpaid creditors unhappy. If it
worked, we would all be worse off. I show below that the best bankruptcy estates are the empty ones. The people who don't get paid are
the very ones who shouldn't get paid. That showing should introduce
Critical Murphian Studies to the legal community, and, thus, belatedly
obtain for Murphy the recognition he so richly deserves.
Part I briefly examines the conventional explanation for bankruptcy's defining characteristic, its default distributional rule. 5 It concludes that the conventional explanation is insufficiently informative
for us to tell whether the Bankruptcy Code (Code)6 is actually working or not. Part II argues that the only existing systematic attempt to
explain bankruptcy law, the so-called "Creditors' Bargain" Theory, is
inadequate for two reasons. First, the predictions it generates are belied by real-world events. Second, it is mistaken on theoretical
grounds, primarily because it ignores how debtors are likely to manage
their assets. Part III presents the Murphian theory of failing behavior,
the hypothesis that the debtors are efficient liquidators of their own
declining affairs. This Part shows how both solvent and insolvent
debtors faced with losses can be expected to manage their assets in
optimal ways without bankruptcy legislation. Part IV summarizes the
conclusions drawn from elementary Murphian theory and suggests another weakness in the Creditors' Bargain model: it disregards the ben4. Although the remainder of this article will break the logic of this deduction into many
discrete substeps, it also follows directly from Murphy's Law itself. Belaboring the obvious,
suppose the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to achieve state of affairs A. Murphy's law
predicts (in its weaker form) that if there are contingencies permitting the arrival at the state
Not-A, Not-A is where things will wind up. The strong version of the law, of course, insists that
such contingencies always will exist. This Article makes only the weaker claim that they do
exist, not that they must, although, in candor, the likelihood that they might ever not exist is
minuscule. The foregoing thought is not original with this writer. O'Rourke's First Legislative
Corollary formulated in 1913 ("Reality will thwart the intentions of Congressmen, if it is true
that they had any") said as much.
5. I speak here of bankruptcy as a creditors' remedy system only. It is true that our bank·
ruptcy law also provides significant benefits to debtors, most importantly in the form of partial or
total discharge from debt. So many people closely identify debtor protection with bankruptcy
that my assertion of the importance of bankruptcy's creditor protection scheme might seem con·
troversial. In segregating debtor protection from creditors' remedies for purposes of analysis, I
am only following the conventional distinctions found in other works which will be discussed
here. See sources cited infra note 18.
6. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
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efits of having debtors distribute their own assets. From the existing
theory, it projects reasons for believing that optimal distributions are
likely to occur without the intervention of bankruptcy. It ends by
speculating on why we are tempted to adopt and then tinker with
bankruptcy law, even in the face of the O'Conner Construct ("You
can't fine-tune a mess"). 7
I.

THE POVERTY OF PARITY POLICY: WHAT EQUALITY THEORY
DOESN'T TELL Us

The first theorem derived from Murphy's Law was developed by
Murphy himself, and came to be known as Edsel's Edict. It states:
"The better you think you understand what's going on, the less likely
it is that you really do." This study begins by showing that bankruptcy scholarship proves the validity of the Edict.
Classic bankruptcy law, as I will use that term, is a collective creditors' remedy with one defining feature: the procedure provides in advance just how the proceeds recovered by the collective will be
distributed among its members. The fundamental policy of bankruptcy law, goes the ritual incantation, is to obtain equal treatment for
creditors of the same class (at least in "straight" bankruptcies). 8 That
at least, is surely Congress' intent. 9 Professor Countryman recently
documented that intent as he traced the history of preference law. 10
Suppose the debtor pays one creditor but not another. The provisions
in the Code that void the preferential payment could have been justified because Congress disapproved either of the debtor's reasons for
making payment or of the creditor's for collecting it. Since Congr~s
7. I am indebted to Stephan Kinsella, LSU Law Center Class of 1991, for leading me to
O'Conner's observation.
8. "The theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution'; and if one claimant is to be
preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute." Nathanson v. NLRB, 344
U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (citation omitted); see also 3 J. MOORE & L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1f 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1977); REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 19 (1973); cf.
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1695, 1780-87 (1985), for an analogous argument that equality is equity in the distribution
of tender offer proceeds.
The specific equality required by the Bankruptcy Code is pro rata equality. If the debtor has
assets of $100 to be distributed, and has only two creditors owed, respectively, $600 and $400,
the assets will be distributed to the creditors in proportion to the size of their claims or $60 to the
first creditor and $40 to the second.
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988). Bruce Johnsen, a fellow follower of Murphy, pointed out
that in discussing congressional intent I had ignored his own contribution to Murphian thought.
The Johnsen Judgment opines that any legislator's intent is nearly always to take wealth from
one pocket and to move it in the most practical but direct fashion into another pocket, preferably
his own. The text accompanying note 107 infra indicates how the Judgment helps to explain
§ 726(b).
10. Countryman, supra note 3, at 714-25.
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made the motives of both irrelevant when it defined which transfers
were avoidable, nothing explains why Congress outlawed preferences
except an intent that the two creditors be treated "equally." 11
The troubling thing about that conclusion is, however, that there
seems to be no good reason why Congress should care. Professor
Weisberg has convincingly shown that the morality of equal treatment
among creditors is and always has been controversial. 12 Congress itself has also been ambivalent about strict pro rata equality. Distributions in reorganizations under Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the Code
can be made "unequally." Reorganization plans can sort creditors
into fluid and differing classes for the purposes of treating them
differently. 13
Moreover, if Congress thought bankruptcy law was needed to
achieve "equality," either its conclusion was superfluous or its reasoning morally and logically incoherent. If creditors were in fact "equal,"
there is no reason to believe that they would not be treated accordingly. Imagine a world in which all creditors were clones. Debtors
would have no reason to prefer one clone over another. If one did
receive more than another, the difference in treatment would, by definition, be simply random. Risk-neutral clones would be indifferent as
between a guarantee of being paid equally with all the other clones, or
a random chance of being preferred or disfavored in a random
amount. Over a volume of credit transactions, the outcome would be
the same. Bad debt would be evenly distributed across the population
of creditor clones. Bankruptcy law would be unnecessary in order to
guarantee ultimate "equal" pro rata treatment. Consequently, the
problem must be that creditors are not in fact "equal" to each other, in
which case we are left to wonder why Congress wants unequal people
to be treated equally.14
11. Id. at 748.
12. Weisberg, Commercial Morality, The Merchant Character. and the History of the Voida·
ble Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1986).
13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, l123(a)(l)-(4), 1222(a)(3)-(b)(2), 1322(a)(3)-(b)(2), § 901(a)
(1988). The congressional commitment to "equality" is also undercut for the claims of specific
creditors. Since pro rata distributions are computed using the amount of a creditor's "allowed
claim" and the claims of certain creditors are not "allowed" in as full measure as are the claims
of other creditors, the distributional formula does not result in "equal" treatment of the disfa·
vored claims except in a formal sense. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).
14. Risk-averse clones would, of course, prefer guaranteed to random treatment. There are
at least theoretical reasons for believing that when creditors are firms, they will evaluate credit
risk from a risk-neutral standpoint. See, e.g., Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priori·
ties: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 22-24 (1981) (corporate management's
goal of maximizing the market value of corporate stock implies risk-neutrality). Individuals, of
course, are assumed to be risk-averse. Pro rata distribution treats individuals and firms the same.
Another way of framing the mystery in the congressional formula is to ask why Congress would
want to treat the most risk-averse creditors exactly like the least risk-averse.
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It is no answer to say that "equal" treatment of different people is
nevertheless a normative standard worth pursuing for itself. Appeals
to simple "equality" can not justify the pro rata equality required by
the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, most unsecured creditors left in bankruptcies are treated "equally." They all receive zero. Simple "equality" may justify pro rata distributions, but it also justifies dividing the
estate per capita, equalizing the percentage of total wealth lost by each
creditor, and a host of other possible formulae which possess an attribute of formal "equality." Choosing among equality formulae is impossible without pointing to normative standards other than
"equality" itself. 15 Consequently, bankruptcy's pro rata formula cannot be explained by a desire for simple "equality." The formula must
instead be justified by a wish to foster some other unarticulated underlying norm, but we are left in the dark about what that norm is. While
we remain in the dark, bankruptcy policy is incomprehensible. If, on
conventional grounds, we do not know why it exists or how it can be
justified, it is difficult to know whether or not bankruptcy law is working. It is also difficult to justify any proposals to change it.

II.

POOLS, PRISONERS AND PIES: THE PERILOUS PARABLES OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW

Anti-Murphian scholars 16 believe there is an underlying normative
criterion which justifies bankruptcy equality, to wit: wealth maximization. They argue that pro rata distribution of debtors' estates
tends to encourage efficient behavior. Murphian theory implies that
nonequality is the only distributional standard which is wealth maximizing, which suggests that those scholars' attempts to justify bankruptcy are misguided. In this Part, I examine their argument.
No one proposes that all creditors' remedies be collective proceedings.17 Understanding bankruptcy law thus means understanding why
15. Weston, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
16. See writers and works cited infra note 18.
17. For the obvious reason that it would be pointlessly costly to involve Creditors A, B, 4
... M in what is essentially a disagreement between the debtor and Creditor N. If a collective
proceeding is relatively easily available, the failure of A, B, 4 ... M to initiate it is evidence that
they are indifferent about the outcome of the Debtor/N dispute. In this connection, it is interesting to note that only a tiny percentage of all bankruptcy proceedings are commenced involuntarily. See, e.g., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS Table x, at 133 (1977) (reporting that only 0.6% of all petitions filed
from 1968 to 1977 were involuntary cases). If the debtors' estates are empty when the proceedings are voluntarily commenced, however, it is difficult to imagine that creditors could not have
proved the grounds necessary for the grant of an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(l)
(1988) provides that the petitioning creditor need merely show that the debtor is generally not
paying her debts as they become due.
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and when collective proceedings are appropriate. Anti-Murphians
have attempted to explain bankruptcy law by likening the insolventdebtor/creditors relationship to a "common pool" or "prisoner's dilemma."18 Those metaphors have proved useful in explaining law and
legal institutions. They illustrate circumstances in which fighting over
who gets the pieces reduces the size of the pie. Competitive behavior
of that sort leads to suboptimal allocation of scarce resources by wasting possible pie. 19 Law can be economically justified if it induces actors to replace such situationally destructive competition with more
efficient cooperative activity. This essay does not challenge the usefulness of those heuristics. It does question whether they apply to
bankruptcy.
My argument begins by recasting the Anti-Murphian pool, prisoner and pie images into an appropriate Murphian form. In Murphian poetics the vulture symbolizes the force which regulates reality.
Pictures of pools and pies elicit unrealistically pleasurable, possibly optimistic images. Even the prisoner metaphor evokes notions that disasters are voluntarily avoidable. Rigorous Murphian analysis
requires a root of appropriately hopeless hue, which is why the vulture, and not fishing, pastry, or even plea-bargains must constitute our
starting point. 20
18. See generally Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Spring
1987, at 173, 183-84; T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 28-31 (1986);
Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1985); D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 31-35 (1985) (arguing that the debtor/
multiple creditor relationship, functioning in a regime of state "grab-law" creditors' remedies,
creates perverse incentives leading to a common pool problem in which each creditor in serving
his own self-interest gains less from his actions than he might harm the other creditors and that
creditors would, therefore, in the absence of information, agree to pro rata sharing to preserve
the benefits of collective action in liquidating and paying out the debtor's estate); R. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS 224-28 (1985) (same); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); see also Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 691, 700--07 (1986) (suggesting that creditors might
adopt a loss-sharing formula like the general average in admiralty, which resembles the pro rata
distribution in bankruptcy, because they are risk-averse, and sometimes the incentives to avoid or
reduce risks need not be dampened by loss-sharing agreements); Jackson & Scott, On the Nature
ofBankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and The Creditors' Bargain, 15 VA. L. REV. 155
(1989) (arguing that creditors might agree to pro rata sharing as a form of catastrophe insurance,
but concluding that the administrative costs of accomplishing such an objective may outweigh
the insurance benefits).
As the reader can well imagine, the subject of perverse incentives, the rock on which Jackson,
Baird, and Scott build their cases, is a subject dear to the hearts ofMurphians. Thus to claim, as
I will below, that things are not as perverse as they seem may sound like heresy. My defense is
that once perversity becomes accepted fact, a new and higher state is reached, that of
metaperversity, in which the perverse thing to think is that things aren't so perverse after all.
19. See generally R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CoOPERATION (1984).
20. It is worth speculating whether the choice of too-rosy metaphors explains why the Anti·
Murphian analysts went wrong, but that is beyond the scope of this study. The 14th corollary
("If things seem to be coming your way, you're in the wrong lane") indicates that might have
happened.
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Reflections on Common Pools

Once upon a time, a vulture cruised the desert observing critters
plodding over the sand. It ignored several fat ones. When meaty critters die, there is enough food for everyone and thus no reason to linger
and watch them. Eventually, however, the vulture saw a dying critter
which didn't have enough flesh on its bones to feed the entire flock.
That discovery led the vulture to begin circling to ensure that when
death came, it would be first in line to chomp on the carcass. Other
vultures saw the first one circling. Guessing what was afoot and not
wishing to miss an impending feast, they too joined the circle. Soon,
the entire flock was going round and round. 21
Each vulture noted that as other members joined the circling flock,
prospects of getting a full meal diminished. Skittish vultures became
overeager22 and were tempted to sneak in and snarf up some sirloin
21. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 16 (arguing that the first-in-time priority system typical
of nonbankruptcy creditors' remedy systems induces creditors to duplicate the costs of monitoring debtors and to waste resources racing to courthouses to be first in line with claims to the
debtor's assets).
22. THE FAR SIDE

"Julian ... you're cheating."
Copyright 1987. Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
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even while there was life left in the failing critter. 23 As a result, the
critter was prematurely dismembered. Many unfed vultures wondered
whether, had the critter been able to reach a water hole, it might have
put on enough meat to feed the entire flock. Worse, the carcass was
not butchered as part of a plan to yield rib-eyes and roasts. Tom up in
a free-for-all, valuable cuts became chopped meat. 24
The moral of the story is simple: Murphy's Law primes Pareto
Optimality. 25 Nature, in all of its disastrous manifestations, is always
necessitating interactions which make someone worse off. Despite the
time and energy vultures spend circling, watching26 to see whether
other vultures are circling, and disguising their own activity, their diet
consists of little hamburger and almost no T-Bone.
The Anti-Murphians, unfortunately, have not been content merely
to replicate the proof of this essential Murphian insight. They claim
an ideal bankruptcy-type act could ameliorate the vultures'
problems. 27 The claim that Congress could repeal Murphy's Law is
transparently preposterous. Only Murphy's Law itself could explain
why anybody would take such a claim seriously. 28 Nevertheless, to
establish the superiority of the Murphian Model, it will be useful to
clear the underbrush first. The mistakes of the Anti-Murphians are
23. Compare Baird, supra note 18, at 183 (in the absence of a collective assessment strategy,
creditors will rush to claim a debtor's assets regardless of recuperative potential) with A.
SCHWARTZ & R. Scorr, CoMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 777 (1982)
(ariullg that under nonbankruptcy law, creditors have perverse incentives to collect too early).
As Murphy would have predicted, however, there is also significant scholarly opinion that under
bankruptcy law, the incentive system changes so that creditors end up trying to collect too late.
See, e.g., T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 205-06; Lopucki, supra note 3.
24. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 14-15 (describing administrative costs, and the waste
that might occur from piecemeal dismemberment of a debtor's estate under state "grab-law"
creditors' remedies).
25. Pareto Optimality (so named for Italian Economist Vilfredo Pareto, its first formulator)
is a normative welfare criterion used by economists to evaluate varying states of economic affairs.
A situation is said to be "Pareto Optimal" when it is impossible to effect a change benefiting one
individual without harming someone else. See, e.g., w. BAUMOL, EcONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 561 (4th ed. 1977). For a discussion of the significance of the Pareto criteria and other competing economic welfare measures, see Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and
Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980).
26. See supra note 22.
27. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18.
28. Not everyone does. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 3, at 823-27; Eisenberg, Commentary on "On the Nature ofBankruptcy": Bankruptcy and Bargaining, 75 VA. L. REv. 205 (1989);
Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1011 (1987); Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature ofBankruptcy":
Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REv. 219 (1989) (all criticizing the Creditors'
Bargain metaphor). Although the doubters do not base their disagreements on Murphian
grounds, the fact that disagreement exists about erroneous ideas has been cited as evidence for
the proposition that it is the weaker rather than stronger form of Murphy's Law which actually
prevails in the real world.
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best exposed by considering the scenario envisioned by their
prescriptions.
B.

The Fable of Flankruptcy -

Cures for the Common Pool

The vultures realized the flock would prosper if they all agreed to
schedule the banquet at the optimal moment, butcher the carrion into
choice cuts and distribute portions equally. Flock members could
then engage in productive activity (like cruising for new carrion or
sieeping) instead of spying on each other and circling, and yet eat flank
steak instead of scraps. Holdout and free-rider problems prevented
them from agreeing, however. Fortunately, Congress realized the vultures needed to be saved from themselves and enacted an optimal collective scavenging law, adopting the terms that the vultures would
have bargained for had they been able to agree - a Flankruptcy Act.
Murphians observed that the carcass was a conspicuous nonparty
to the Vultures' Bargain. 29 Cynics agreed that the Flankruptcy Act
had been predicted by Mulligan's Mandate for Multi-Party Conflicts
("Let's you and me agree before the fight to gang up and clean him
out"). 30 The Vultures' Bargain proponents implicitly assume that carcasses do not care if they are ganged up on or not, and assert, "What's
good for vultures is good for carcasses."31
Whatever its motivation, The Flankruptcy Act had predictable
features. There was an automatic "King's-X" on the death of the carrion to prevent any vulture from sneaking bites before the others ar-:
rived. 32 To discourage the overeager from trying to evade the King'sX rule, premature biters were required to regurgitate any chunks eaten
pre-mortem. 33 Butchers were appointed to cut up carcasses which, by,
replacing frenzied ad hoc carving committees, lowered butchering ex29. Countryman, supra note 3, at 827 n.603.
30. The possibility of collusion between any two players in three-party games makes outcomes of such games unpredictable. See, e.g., H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 257-74 (1982).
31. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 13 (asserting that the happiness of debtors can be
derived from the happiness of creditors: "If the creditors have to protect themselves by means of
a costly and inefficient system [referring to state creditors' remedies], Debtor is going to have to
pay more to obtain credit."). It is possible, of course, that debtors would agree to a bankruptcy
act so long as there were goodies in the act for them as well. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 18, at
174 (arguing that early English bankruptcy legislation provided a discharge for debtors in order
to induce them to cooperate with their creditors). This paper does not discuss the discharge
feature of the current Bankruptcy Code.
32. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 151 (arguing that the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1988) which provides for an automatic stay of all collection activity upon the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings is to stop individual creditor activity that might undermine the collective
enterprise).
33. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988); T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 125 ("Approached from the
perspective of the common pool, preference law exists to prevent creditors from trying to change
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penses. 34 Butchers were charged with distributing the carved carrion
to members of the flock in equal portions. 35
Tne fable makes interesting literature. Anti-Murphians, however,
argue it shows vultures can live happily ever after, a conclusion that
does not follow. The notion that anybody could live happily ever after
violates every known Murphian principle.
If we enact a bankruptcy law it should be engineered to do as little
damage as is possible. My disagreements with the Anti-Murphians on
engineering questions only amount to quibbles. 36 The point of the parable for the Anti-Murphians, however, is not that bankruptcy could
and should be made better but that a world with a bankruptcy law is
better than a world without one. That Murphian theory denies. The
denial is credible. Vultures' Bargains do not seem to be very
profitable.
1.

The Factual Flaws of Flankruptcy

Even within the logic of the parable, a Flankruptcy system has
costs. Whether we ought to have Flankruptcy is not a question of
metaphor or theory, but rather of numbers. 37 Do the benefits exceed
the costs? Efficiency, even using a weak measure, is after all potentially an empirical concept. The existing numbers do not suggest the
ending of the vulture story is a happy one. 38 Although better data
might discourage .us less, it is difficult to believe that the point of the
Vultures' Bargain was to adopt a regime in which vultures end up with
little or nothing. Maybe the failure of the existing mandate for collective behavior to produce any apparent benefits for the cooperating actors results from small defects in the present terms of the mandatory
charter. That is the tinkerer's basic hope. If the Vultures' Bargain
theory has in fact been largely implemented, but the predicted benefits
to the vultures do not materialize, it is equally possible that something
is wrong with the theory.
The Anti-Murphians acknowledge that replacing an array of inditheir existing position vis-a-vis other creditors in anticipation of bankruptcy's collective proceedings (or having the debtor do it for them).").
34. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 702, 323, 704 (1988).
35. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining that the division of the debtor's estate
might vary in a real, negotiated creditors' bargain, but that lacking information about the bargaining strengths and skills of all of the involved creditors, pro rata is about the best one could do
in coming up with a formula for the actual distribution).
36. See Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself. 39 STAN. L. REV. 1519
(1987), for someone else's quibbles.
37. This much, at least, has been recently conceded even by Anti-Murphians. See Jackson &
Scott, supra note 18, at 203.
38. For the numbers, see sources cited supra note 2.
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vidualized remedies with a mandatory collective process imposes costs
on the community of vultures which result from either the inability or
failure to engineer perfectly a Flankruptcy system. 39 After passage of
the Act, the vultures' expectations change as their prospective remedies shift from the old to the new system. Some perceive the new regime to be disadvantageous in some cases, so they expend resources
trying to keep the flock out of a Flankruptcy proceeding for some carcasses. Others, for similar opportunistic reasons, may seek to initiate
proceedings in inappropriate circumstances. Drafting precise rules
which stop such strategic behavior is difficult. Administering looser
standards is equally costly, requiring extensive, and therefore expensive, inquiry into motives. 40
There are other costs of Flankruptcy, however, which the AntiMurphians do not explicitly acknowledge. Flankruptcy requires the
formation of a "firm" with appointment of "management" (a trustee
vulture or butcher) and conflicts of interest among its "owners." The
creation of firms can be explained on efficiency grounds when transaction costs of organizing productive activity using market contracts are
high, 41 but conducting business in that form never comes free. 42 Administering a firm, even one with the narrow mission of scavenging a
single carcass, spawns agency costs as the management tries to exprqpriate the gains the owners hoped to obtain by forming the firm, and
the owners struggle with each other for control. Conflict doesn't go
away in firms. It merely takes a different form. 43
The inability to engineer an appropriate division of any carcass
under the collective system imposed serious social costs on the community of vultures. The Flankruptcy Act regulated only salvaging of
carcasses that had already been found. It did not coordinate the
butchering and distributing of dead carcasses with other vulture activity (like cruising in search of new carrion) which remained unregulated, but it affected that behavior nonetheless. In the preFlankruptcy state of nature, there was some greater-than-pro-rata payoff to vultures for being strong, swift, or clever. The prospect oflarger
rewards for finding carrion which might not have to be shared tended
39. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 957-58; Jackson & Scott, supra note 18, at 197-202.
40. Jackson & Scott, supra note 18, at 197-202.
41. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937).
42. Indeed, the "Ain't no free lunches" rule was one of the earliest Murphian discoveries.
43. See generally o. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). This observation was also one of the early fruits of the Critical
Murphian Studies Movement. Liam O'Brian, an early Murphian, formulated it in a more precise
fashion, to wit: "The costs of administration will expand so as to be greater than or equal to the
value of the estate."
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to induce the most efficient scavengers to cruise, looking for dying critters. The pro rata outcome under Flankruptcy, which promised the
weak and lazy vultures a free ride from the activity of their stronger
brothers and sisters, diminished the incentive for the strong, swift, and
clever to search for new carrion. The Act thus tended to eliminate the
gains (even if they were only in the form of scraps) to the flock from
the extra carcasses which might have been found by the strong had
they the former, larger incentive to search. As a consequence, by the
time carrion was found by the flock, much if not all of the meat had
rotted off the bones. The corpses with meat on them seemed to have
fewer pounds of it. That led to proposals to pay a bounty to any vulture discovering a corpse.44
There is an analogous potential social cost ofbankruptcy.45 To the
extent it works, it eliminates part of the competitive advantage of creditors who are master monitors46 and capable collectors, raising the
cost of credit to the level charged by less efficient creditors. Whether
our lower credit costs gained by eliminating common pools outweigh
our losses from having to borrow at rates which protect less effective
lenders is a question to which we have no direct answer. At present,
creditors actually get very little out of bankruptcy so the savings we
obtain from a supposedly superior salvage technique look small. Since
most bankruptcy estates are empty ones, it may be that the superior
collectors already do get paid, so we may not be paying extra. The
free riders may be getting nothing. In that case, of course, bankruptcy
is a pure waste, since it costs us to undertake the proceedings, but we
do not really get anything for it. (The butchers, however, may live
happily ever after.)
A pro rata formula can be justified only as the best we can do
lacking more information (at the time the statute is being drafted).
44. See, e.g., T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 207; Lopucki, supra note 3, at 363-68. Of course,
bounties are difficult to design. Among other things, vultures competing for bounties tend to
look just like vultures competing for carcasses, with much duplication of effort, attempts to disguise it, etc. Indeed, the argument that priority systems among creditors might be justified as
devices which prevent such waste has been made by Anti-Murphians in other contexts. See
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143
(1979); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J.
49 (1982). For an analysis of a similar problem suggesting that such duplications of effort are
likely to be inevitable, see also Goldberg, Fishing and Selling, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1986).
Indeed, if the theory ofFlankruptcy is that its collective nature is intended to benefit vultures,
one would expect the vultures to be initiating a substantial portion of these beneficial proceedings. In fact, it is the carcasses who are the movers in most cases. See supra note 17.
45. See, e.g., Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis ofBankruptcy, LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 47, 48 (1977) (arguing that while complete relaxation of
bankruptcy laws may harm borrowers more than help them, some further relaxation would enhance the existing social benefits of the credit system, providing "greater net social benefits").
46. See supra note 22.
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Real vultures, like real debtors and creditors, in real cases know which
vultures are strong and which are weak. The pro rata requirement is
intended to force them to behave as though they were ignorant. The
information they have (but must disregard) as parties to a legislated
pro rata creditors' or vultures' bargain, is socially valuable. Making
life run as though people are ignorant wastes the value of their information which is likely to be substantial. Real creditors striking real,
presumably optimal bargains would arrive at distributional terms
shaped by that information. The "Bankruptcy Bargain" is thus, even
in theory, suboptimal. In order to evaluate the bargain paradigm it
must be compared with the claim that somehow debtor or creditor
behavior, as shaped by nonbankruptcy law, is likely to be defective.
Even if common pool problems resulted in suboptimal distributions,
two suboptimal regimes must be compared. It is Murphian Truth that
life is nothing but the process of choosing between evils. The issue
always is: which is the lesser? I suggest below that debtors are likely
to make distributions of their diminishing assets using real, not hypothetical, information and, by doing so, tend to optimize the value of
the distributions to the debtor and creditors as a group. For now I
conclude only that bankruptcy is not delivering what the theory
promises and that the case for an Act improved by any sort of tinkerin~ is, at best, unproved.
2.

The Logical Problems with the Parable

One reason why the benefits predicted by the parable seldom materialize is that the logic of the parable is flawed. Debtor-creditor games
are different from vulture-carrion games. Since the Anti-Murphian
logic assumes the games are alike, its foundations are faulty. Even
brilliant engineering cannot save a structure erected on that assumption. The Bargain Theory errs by ignoring the economics of failure in
our real Murphian world.
Common pools have unowned, nonreactive resources in the pool.
The fish in the sea, the oil and gas in the ground, and the soil and grass
in the tragic feudal commons do not care who captures them. 47 In our
fable, the forlorn critter caught dying in the desert is likewise a purely
passive character in the plot. Dead, he does not care how his carcass
is butchered or which vulture gets the stew meat and which gets the
soup bones. In real debtor-creditor relationships, debtors are not pas47. For examples of analyses of common pools, see Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REv. 855 (1971) (mentioning
oil and gas reservoirs and fisheries among other examples); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (unowned grazing land).
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sive. For that reason, such relationships do not generate common
pools. Moreover, the classical prescription for solving a common pool
problem is to create property rights in the assets in the pool.48 In the
real Murphian world, the pool consisting of the debtor's assets is already "owned" by someone - the debtor. Bankruptcy law cannot,
therefore, be justified as an efficient solution for a common pool.
To adapt the parable to reality, assume that critters are in herds
owned by debtors and replace the vultures in the story with a number
of equally hungry creditors. If the owner-debtors can be forced by any
nonbankruptcy creditors' remedy to dole out the value of the critters
to creditors, those debtors have every interest in butchering the critters
at the moment they achieve optimum weight into optimal proportions
of steak and hamburger. 49 In other words, once a property right is
granted to a debtor over her own assets she will maximize their value
for her own benefit. In doing so, she will take into account the costs to
her creditors as well.
For the logic of the pool argument to hold, incentives for the
owner of pool assets to react must somehow disappear. That allegedly
happens on "insolvency."50 If all the benefits from feeding and carefully butchering the critters will inevitably be captured by creditors,
the debtor allegedly no longer has any incentive to maximize asset
value. 51 Hence, the argument goes, control should pass to the creditors who do have the incentive, if they are forced to act cooperatively.
The insolvency argument is both factually and theoretically in error. Insolvency is not the point at which the maximization motive
shifts from debtors to creditors if insolvency is measured by the market. Market value is an imperfect measure of the value of the assets to
48. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 47, at 872-84; Hardin, supra note 47, at 1245.
49. Without creditors, debtors may maximize in another fashion - if the debtors prefer
hamburger, they will butcher it that way. Stated didactically, people will maximize the value of
their assets according to their own preferences. That value is not necessarily the market value.
Nevertheless, in order to minimize losses, when one has creditors whose claims can only be
satisfied by a market transaction, one will then have an incentive to maximize market values as
well.
50. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 122.
51. Common pool theorists do predict that debtors will react to losses by acting perversely.
They assume that insolvent debtors are willing to engage in high risk behavior since, after the
insolvency point, they keep the gains from undertaking risk, but the losses are imposed on their
creditors. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38
VAND. L. REv. 829, 833-34 (1985). The perversity assumption conflicts with the passivity presumption. The more at-risk-to-creditors assets the debtors have available to gamble with, the
better off debtors are. This means it is unlikely that they will remain passive even if they are
insolvent. My argument below challenges the notion that many debtors are truly insolvent when
all their wealth is taken into account, and shows that there are forces which lead debtors to want
to hold wealth in forms accessible to creditor seizure. In any case, the perversity presumption
may justify stronger or better creditors' remedies, but does not justify a collective remedy, since if
it is true, it tends to negate the existence of a common pool.
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their owners who ordinarily value them for their infra-marginal rents
(consumer or producer surpluses) and their marginal quasi rents. 52
Thus market-insolvent debtors have incentives to maximize the value
of the assets in their portfolios to retain as much of the rents as
possible.
Not only is the "insolvency" assumption unjustifiable, but also in
the real Murphian world the market-insolvent debtor can gain by
choosing which creditors to pay. The available data indicate that insolvent debtors do liquidate and distribute their own estates until they
have no distributable value to any remaining creditors. 53 That is far
beyond the point of market insolvency (the level at which the market
value of the debtor's assets is just under the aggregate of the creditors'
claims). Such observed behavior provides strong indication that the
debtor passivity implicitly assumed in the Creditors' Bargain model
exists in theory but not in the real world. 54 What we need is either a
new world which actually suffers from the defect of debtor docility or
a new theory which explains the behavior of failing debtors. Inasmuch
as revising the world to make it match the theory is the more difficult
choice, I will take the easy route and explore the principles of failure.

Ill.

INTRODUCTION TO MURPHIAN EcONOMICS: AsSET
MANAGEMENT IN THE FACE OF FAILURE

The affinity between Murphian philosophy and economics was recognized in the early histories of both disciplines. Indeed, one of the
first triumphs of economics, the Malthusian theory, resulted from
52. See, e.g., D.B. Johnsen, Specialization, Specificity, and Contracting (1988) (working paper, Business and Public Policy Group, Texas A & M University; manuscript on file at the
Michigan Law Review); J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 218-21, 390-92 (3d
ed. 1984). This point will be elaborated upon in Part III infra. For present purposes, it can be
simply explained as follows: People value their nonmarginal assets more than the highest bidder
in the market values them. Otherwise they would sell out to that bidder. That is why it is
plausible to say that market prices do not reflect how much people value their assets. The difference between how much people value their assets as they are currently being used, and the
amount they value those assets in their next best use (which may be by converting them to cash
in the market) is what we mean by "surpluses" and "rents." If, for example, you would be
willing to pay as much as $1.50 for a gallon of gasoline, but the market is currently offering it to
you at $1.00, you have fifty cents of"rent" in the gallon you just bought. If you used that money
to buy a beer which was barely worth fifty cents to you, your rent takes the form of that beer.
53. The data cited supra note 2 strongly supports this conclusion.
54. It is possible that the prevalence of zero-asset bankruptcy cases could also be explained
by pre-petition levies and garnishments. This is not my experience, or that of most of the practitioners to whom I have spoken, but it is still possible. A recent study of over 1500 bankruptcy
cases showed that of the over 15,000 creditors making claims in those cases, only about four
percent had commenced any pre-bankruptcy collection proceedings. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN
& J. WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 305. Nevertheless, the theory developed below will also indicate that those creditors who do levy or garnish and thereby make recoveries are probably the
ones who should recover.
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Malthus' attempt to confirm that Lullihan's Lemma ("If at first you
don't succeed, don't be surprised.") applied to economic phenomena.
Somewhere we lost the insight that the dismal science grew from the
same root as the dialectics of doom. In this part I hope to reestablish
that lost connection. I will use economic assumptions, thus establishing that both economics and collection law are really incomplete subbranches of the Murphian Cosmos.
In Part II, I showed that the common pool explanation for the
existence of classic bankruptcy law suffers from an implicit logical error - it assumes debtors will remain passive when faced with failure.
The passivity presumption effectively permits theorists to ignore the
existence of debtors. Anti-Murphians focus entirely on the direct relationship between predators and assets, the interaction which creates
the common pool problem. Murphian theory, by contrast, assumes
that the interaction between creditors and assets will be mediated by
the actions of debtors, the very characters whose existence we can easily observe but whom Bargain Theorists ignore. The data suggest that
debtors are not passive, but instead react to creditors or vultures with
the result that bankruptcy estates are mostly empty. What remains to
be shown is how they can be expected to react and whether those reactions should be praised or condemned.
It is customary when confecting theories, even those about life in
the shadow of Murphy's Law, to begin by making assumptions. I
shall start by presupposing six facts about the world. The first two are
plausible to anyone sensitive to the Murphian muse and, therefore,
will be retained throughout the argument. They are:
(1) That debtors (or "Victims" to use the precise Murphian terminology) not only exist, but also are rational. (Murphy never said that
folks don't try their best. He merely questioned whether they gained
much by it.) 55
(2) That the world is also populated by a number of marauding mutant rational vultures who eat pots of gold and when gold gets scarce,
snack on other assets as well. 56

The final four facts illustrate the essential difference between the
55. Unfortunately Murphy was never explicit on why he felt this way, so that even to this
day it is unclear whether we should credit him rather than Herbert Simon with authorship of the
bounded rationality concept. See H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957). On the other hand, he
may have sensed instinctively that divining precisely how people rationalize is itself a complicated question. See, e.g., Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on
the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. RBv.
329 (1986).
56. If you prefer less colorful abstractions, this can be rephrased as an assumption that the
effects of losses are mediated through the rationality of individual economic actors, like vultures
or creditors.
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Murphian and Anti-Murphian world views. We shall begin by assuming, mistakenly:
(3) That everything of value in the world is perfectly divisible into
infinitely small units;
(4) That all those units are costlessly traded in perfect markets;
(5) That all those assets are edible as far as vultures are concemed; 57
and
(6) That Congress has abolished creditors' remedies, which means,
of course, that but for contributory stupidity and other manifestations of
Murphy's Law, there would be no creditors either. 58 (The decision to
ignore the existence of creditors here was not intended as a perverse reaction to the decision of the Anti-Murphians to ignore debtors. I am
merely being explicit and will abandon the assumption before arriving at
any ultimate conclusions.)

The relaxation of each of these assumptions, in tum, and their replacement with their real-life (Le., Murphian) converses will demonstrate the errors which underlie the false presumption of victim
passivity, and at the same time demonstrate how praiseworthy the behavior of Victims really is likely to be. A few other assumptions will
also be made as they become relevant.

A. Dealing with Disaster: Elementary Loss Minimization by
Victims Owning Divisible Assets in Worlds
with Pelfect Markets
I shall start by presupposing that vultures worry about whether
Victims have wealth. Since none of this would be of interest unless, at
least occasionally, Victims do, we will initially take it for granted that
Victims own Things that vultures want. For simplicity, we will begin
by assuming that there are only two kinds of assets in the world, beer
and gasoline. The question that remains is: what happens to those
Things when things go sour.
·
It has long been known that if a Victim has a stock of Things, he
probably has a variety. Victims prefer having some gasoline and some
beer to having a lot of one and none of the other because the more
gasoline each has, the less another gallon is worth to him. Conversely
57. The Murphian edibility assumption rephrased in more conventional terms can be restated as: All assets in the world are desired by all vultures for their own sake; or, more colloquially, "I want whatever you have." We will consider a world in which debtors, for example, can
own assets that creditors might never want when this assumption is later relaxed.
58. This means, of course, that I am assuming that all Victims are solvent (since they have no
debt). For a quibble on my implicit assumption that the absence of legal remedies necessarily
means the absence of creditors, and therefore that there is no debt so a Victim can never be under
water (Le., insolvent), see Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L.
EcoN. & 0RG. 5 (1985).
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the fewer cans of beer each owns, the more he is willing to work or pay
to get another. Economists call that phenomenon the "Law of Demand." Victims who start with a lot of gasoline, therefore, will trade
some of it to get beer. If they own these Things to make profits, 59 they
will sell off gasoline, and buy beer until the extra money they expect to
make by keeping a gallon of gas is more than they think they will earn
by trading it for another can of beer. On the other hand, if they own
either or both Things for personal consumption, they will trade off
gasoline until the anticipated extra value of keeping the last gallon is
more than the extra value they count on getting from trading it for
another quantity of beer. 60
Both producer and consumer Victims suffer heartburn because just
when they have their inventories of gasoline and beer adjusted to an
optimal ratio, things change. Possibly the market price of beer goes
up; maybe Jack the Ripper endorses beer on television; perhaps techniques are invented which permit what was formerly done with a lot of
beer to be done with a lot less. Those events may make the gasoline
left in our Victim's portfolio relatively more valuable to him than beer.
The rise in beer prices raises the opportunity cost of holding beer relative to the cost of holding gasoline, and thus will induce the owner to
sell off a few of the now high-priced beers, and replace them with a few
gallons of the now relatively cheaper gasoline. 61 The television endorsement and the technological change may make our owner desire
beer less than he used to so he will sell some off, replacing it with the
(relatively) more highly desired gasoline. In any event, changes in
taste or technology and fluctuating market prices for assets harass
59. As would a saloon owner who tried to lower delivery costs by picking up his inventory
with his own truck at his supplier's brewery.
60. The discussion oversimplifies by positing that portfolios are adjusted by actual barters of
beer for gasoline. In the ordinary conduct of either life or business, the trade-off decisions are
more likely to be made in the context of deciding how much of an expended stock of an asset to
replace for cash in a market. The point that the last item in any collection is worth less than the
first to buyers and worth more to sellers is not dependent on the bartering context. Readers
whose co=on sense is not attracted by this proposition may find it helpful to contemplate more
concrete examples, like how much they might be willing to pay for a second and then a third
giant sized onion and anchovy pizza with one already in front of them on the table; or, whether
when trapped for a couple of days in the desert with a thousand cans of cold beer, they would
charge a prospector they encounter there the same for a can as they would charge had they only
a single can left. Those dissatisfied by barnyard-level economics or more comfortable with formal presentations, graphs, equations, and the works may wish to consult a standard economics
text which discusses the consequences of declining marginal utility of goods for consumers and
declining marginal productivity (increasing marginal costs) of inputs for producers. See, e.g., W.
FELLNER, MODERN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS chs. 14-16 (1960).
61. Folklore has it that this phenomenon torpedoed the famous Texas Hunt Brothers in their
attempt to comer the silver market. When the market value of their flatware skyrocketed, many
more folks than the Hunts anticipated decided that it was too expensive to eat with, compared
with what else could be purchased with the proceeds if it were melted down and sold.
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profit or value maximizing Victims into redoing their portfolios all
over again. Thus do Murphians explain the existence both of brokers
and Bromo-Seltzer.
Similar adjustments are occasioned by changes in wealth. 62 Pop
quizzes in Econ 101 always have questions like: "What if a lucky fellow receives a surprise bequest of gasoline from his mother-in-law's
second cousin?" The answer is something like: "His equilibrium is
disturbed by the necessity that he decide how much of the new gasoline to keep, and how much to trade for new beer. He will end up with
extra quantities of both if they are superior goods63, sell both if they
are inferior, 64 or buy the superior good and sell off the inferior one. If
they are complements,65 they will be bought (or sold) together. The
relative proportions bought or sold will depend on their respective income elasticities of demand (Engle Curves). Etc. Etc."66
Windfalls, of course, explain nothing about bankruptcy. Murphians have always complained that quizzes assume wealth increases.
Tests never ask: "What if an asset-eating vulture came and snarfed up
a six-pack of Victim's beer?" Bankruptcy lawyers and creditors, however, are very interested in what Victims might do when they experience losses. By symmetrical conversity, losing Victims will buy
replacement beer (or some inferior goods). Gasoline will, therefore, be
traded for the replacements. Just as windfall recipients maximize the
value of new wealth by making a series of investment decisions, debtors in the real world minimize the impact of losses by redoing their
portfolios, making an analogous set of disinvestment decisions. 67 If
62. Note that there is also a wealth (income) effect of the price changes and taste changes
hypothesized in the preceding paragraph. If, for example, the market price of beer declines, the
beer owner is poorer after the price change. The decline in wealth may affect how he decides to
change the ratio of beer to gasoline in his portfolio. This effect is in addition to the incentives to
readjust ratios caused by the changes in relative beer/gasoline prices. See, e.g., R. MILLER,
EcONOMICS TODAY, THE MICRO VIEW 34-36 (5th ed. 1985).
63. Superior goods are those for which the demand increases with increasing wealth. Steak
or diamonds are prototypical. In a two-asset world, of course, alternative investments in superior
(or inferior) goods are not possible. The reference to their existence here thus is getting slightly
ahead of our story.
64. Inferior goods are those for which demand rises as wealth declines. Beans or potatoes
tend to replace steak or diamonds in people's inventories as they experience difficulties.
65. Complementary goods are those whose value increases when used in combination with
each other. Computers and printers, for example, are complements. Substitute goods have the
opposite relationship; typewriters and word processors are an example.
66. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 52, at 98-106 and 327-44 gives a more complete answer for
consumer portfolios and producer portfolios respectively. Like most other economists, he shows
his Anti-Murphian biases. The mathematical functions which he labels the "Income Expansion
Path," for example, could and probably should in the Murphian Universe be called the "Income
Contraction Path" instead. Id. at 99.
67. Disinvestment means, of course, that future income is sacrificed to enhance present income. That people in trouble begin to consume their savings, or attempt to accelerate future
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portfolios of wealth consisted solely of gasoline and beer, we know
gasoline will be sold off when there is a loss of beer. 68
By now you may be wondering "who cares?" Other vultures
would prefer the beer were left for them to guzzle. The Victim probably wishes he had never heard of vultures. But these preferences are
weak since a can of beer is, after all, a small asset. Even were six
taken, six times a small value still adds up to a small loss. Nevertheless, even if Victims and the other vultures rue the loss, does anybody
mind when the Victim thereafter converts some gasoline back into
beer? Not when there are perfect markets for gasoline and beer. If
gasoline can always be costlessly traded for beer, any vulture who prefers gasoline can seize beer and costlessly convert it back again into
gasoline. In a perfect two-asset world, the Victim would thus minimize his losses by adjusting the proportions of the assets held in his
portfolio, and no vulture would care what the proportions were. 69
Pareto Murphy, Edsel's second son, actually noted that this seeming
tendency toward optimality constituted a potential counterexample to
his father's law. 70 We shall investigate the errors which led to this
income into the present by borrowing more, is a testable hypothesis that emerges from Murphian
theory.
68. To be perfectly theoretically correct, we do not know whether this will happen for cer·
tain. We do know that rational Victims will be systematically influenced by what is called the
"substitution effect" to behave in this manner. The loss, however, may also trigger a "wealth" or
"income effect" in the Victim, which will change his behavior in a nonsystematic manner. See,
e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 209-12.
69. Strictly speaking, this need not always be true. It happens that I am indifferent about
whether your portfolio consists of Gizmos or Doodads. If the assets in question were heroin, or
Saturday Night Specials, I might feel differently. Some of my fundamentalist and feminist
friends care a great deal about whether someone they have never met might be losing his or her
soul or sensitivity by collecting pornography. I have Marxist acquaintances who care on different grounds - primarily that nobody should have any wealth at all because they might use it to
oppress people. They conclude we should tum our wealth over to politicians to protect ourselves
from each other, at least until we all finally undergo complete personality changes. That view
has always struck me as having interesting Murphian implications.
The Bankruptcy Code does seem to reflect some desire to encourage certain types of activity
and to discourage other types on essentially political grounds. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § S07(a)(S)
(1988) (giving priority to persons who store grain and fish with bankrupt warehouses, but no
such favoritism to people who store other goods); 11 U.S.C. § S02(b)(6)-(b)(7) (1988) (disallowing claims by holders of certain leases and employment contracts when similar long-term con·
tractual claims by holders of economically similar contracts are allowed). These provisions may
reflect society's views that those who invest in catching fish and growing grain are good and that
those who invest in rental real estate or job specific skills are bad. In general, however, our law of
property and creditors' remedies does not seem to address specific concerns that people should or
should not hold certain types of assets. You may take my assertion that the vultures don't care,
therefore, as one that the law generally doesn't care. The model being formulated here does deal
below, see infra text following note 98, with the consequences that creditors may care about the
market value if not the specific identity of the assets in which debtors choose to invest.
70. Mrs. Edsel Murphy was Italian. Pareto was her maiden name. Only in a Murphian
world could it happen that a distant relative of his in-laws would decades later formulate a
welfare criterion which closely resembles this early false step in the development of Murphy's
metaphysics.
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unwarranted apprehension, when we drop our un-Murphian assumptions about the world.
Suppose now that Victim has three types of wealth rather than
two. Besides gasoline and beer, he owns liquid laundry detergent.
Like gasoline, detergent can be sold off to replace lost beer. We know
from a two-asset world that losses lead to disinvestment. How will a
Victim choose between detergent and gasoline when he disinvests? If
gasoline and detergent are equally divisible into very small units, and
if those units can be costlessly exchanged for beer, a Victim will be
indifferent about which to trade first because the value of the last
ounce of detergent he owns will be precisely equal to the value of the
last unit of gasoline. (Otherwise, in a world in which one could
costlessly be converted into the other, he would already have traded
the less for the more valuable of the two.) Furthermore, which he
trades first doesn't matter much because after the first unit of one asset
is traded, the next unit will be one of the other assets (because the last
remaining unit of the untraded class will now, by hypothesis, be worth
less than the former next-to-last item of the class selected initially). In
other words, we expect in a perfect world that Victim's response to
minor misfortune is to disinvest proportionately in all his other assets
to replace those lost.
That would be fine with all vultures. Why? Because in a threeasset world, just as in the two-asset version, the vulture needn't care
about which assets Victims decide to own. Any vulture can costlessly
convert whatever she grabs into whatever she wants most. To summarize, in a perfect world, Victims will minimize the impact of losses by
readjusting their portfolios. Vultures won't care what assets Victims
hold and what they do with them in making the readjustments. In a
perfect world, therefore, Victims are likely to be the optimal liquidators of their own affairs. By the same token, however, the Victim is
also indifferent about which asset the vultures choose to seize. He can
replace any seized asset by costlessly converting any others he owns
and thus will end up with an optimal portfolio regardless whether it is
he or the vultures who choose which assets are to be consumed. 71
If all assets in the world are literally and figuratively liquid, we
have shown that both Victims and vultures would be indifferent to
each others' behavior. Indifference suggests passivity, of course. In a
perfect world things tum out perfectly no matter what happens. Nobody need care what happens in such a world, but then again, chang71. This conclusion is simply another application of the Cease theorem, that in a world without transaction costs, optimal resource allocation will be reached regardless of the allocation of
property rights. See Cease, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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ing anything because of that indifference also would be unnecessary.
Murphians have seldom taken comfort from that theoretical
possibility.
B. Loss Minimization with Indivisible Assets in
Well-Functioning Markets

Alas, the world isn't perfect, as Murphy well knew. Assets don't
come in finely divisible units, but rather in discrete economic lumps.
Suppose critters come in three varieties, Goodzes, Betrs, and Bezzts,
and Victim owns one of each. Each weighs one hundred pounds and
can be sold for butchering for one dollar per pound. Victim, however,
has trained his Goodz to play the fiddle, his Betr to juggle flaming
torches, and his Bezzt to walk on a tightrope. As performing animals,
their values no longer depend on their divisibility into pounds of meat,
but rather on what they will bring if sold to circuses. 72 Figure One
portrays such a portfolio.
Suppose, as shown, Victim would pay as much as $1600 for his
Bezzt, $1200 for his Betr, and $800 for his Goodz. 73 If we treat the
dotted line as the market price for each asset (assuming a perfect market), each can be costlessly converted to $800 cash. 74 Initially it appears irrational that Victim would tolerate this state of affairs. Why
hasn't he sold the Goodz for $800 and used it to purchase another
72. Of course, if there were ways to accomplish it legally, the services of the animals could be
sold by some divisible time unit. Indeed, in an economic sense, the value of any asset is the
presently capitalized value of its future services which are nearly always potentially divisible. In
a world in which the extension of economic credit cannot be legally protected, however, it is
difficult to make such divisions by contract. Since vultures are unlikely to wait long enough for
debtors to divide their assets over time, we will ignore that possibility in the analysis that follows.
73. This assumption means that, if he had no Bezzts, he would buy one if the market price
were less than $1600, and ifthere were no markets, the Victim wouldn't agree to sell one for less
than that amount. Of course, since there is a market price in the figure ($800) he wouldn't really
pay more than $800 to any seller since he could always get what he wanted on the market for
that price. Also, since there is a market, he would take anything over $800 for his Bezzt, use
$800 of the sale proceeds to replace it and keep the balance as an increase in wealth. In the
absence of markets, what he would pay and what he would take are identical at the margin. The
differences between the market values in the diagram and the Victim's values (the lined areas in
the diagram) arise from the presence of rents. Why do rents exist? For individuals, willingness
to pay much more than the current market price can be ascribed to strongly felt needs or desires
for the good in question. Some people want tightrope-walking Bezzts a lot more than others.
For firms, rents usually arise because the asset is very specialized, and thus extremely valuable to
the firm, but not to other buyers in the market who do not have the specialized use for it. See
references cited supra note 52.
74. The assumption that the market prices are the same for each of these assets is made
simply for analytical convenience. The point illustrated, that market prices do not reflect the
Victim's values so that he does have preferences about the assets in his portfolio which do not
correlate with market prices, is simply made more clear. A more elaborate model which assumed different market prices and rents for different assets would reach the same conclusion, but
the argument would be more complicated.
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FIGURE ONE

THE INDIVISIBLE AsSET PORTFOLIO

Value

Bezzt

$1600
$1500
$1400
$1300

Betr

$1200
$1100
$1000
$900
$800-

--

Goodz

- -- -

-- - -

--

Asked

$700* **** ****** ******* ****** ******* ****** *** Bid
$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0

ASSET

Bezzt worth $1600 to him? Recall the declining value phenomenon
underlying the law of demand. 75 Although the first Bezzt is worth
$1600 to him, he values the second at less than $800. If trained Bezzts
only come in indivisible chunks, the portfolio shown above can be optimal and is worth $3600 to its owner.
Now suppose Victim's Bezzt is eaten by a vulture. In Murphian
75. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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reality, losses are no longer insignificantly small. Even though his assets have equal market prices, the Victim values them differently. He
will sell the asset he values least, the Goodz, for $800 and use the cash
to replace the bolted Bezzt. 76 (If the vulture ate the less highly prized
Betr, the result is the same so long as it could be replaced by sale of the
same Goodz.) When markets function well, Victims can convert any
disaster into losses of the least valued assets in their portfolios.
Whichever asset the vulture eats, the Victim's inventory, after adjustment, will consist of one Bezzt and one Betr. When markets work
well, Victims are indifferent about which assets are lost (or seized) just
as vultures are indifferent about which assets Victims maintain for
them to grab, because either can costlessly use the markets to convert
any asset they retain or grab into whichever substitute of equal market
value yields them the greatest rent. Table One, below, illustrates the
Victim's history after the vulture raid.
TABLE ONE
ADJUSTMENTS TO PORTFOLIOS OF INDIVISIBLE AsSETS
IN A WORLD WITH PERFECT MARKETS

Assets
Bezzt
Betr
Goo dz
Value to Victim
Market Value

Original
Position

$1600
1200
800
3600

2400

After
Loss

1200
800
2000
1600

After
Adjustment

$1600
1200
2800
1600

While nothing can reduce the market value of the loss Victim has suffered, the portfolio adjustment apparently permits him to limit his
losses to that amount, and convert the loss of an asset which has high
rents to him into the loss of an asset with zero rents. In other words,
the adjustment makes the portfolio more valuable to the Victim, but
need not affect its market value.
The apparent loss may understate the impact of the vulture raid on
the Victim, however. Losses, even minimized by a portfolio adjustment, are not necessarily limited to the $800 illustrated in the table.
Another consequence of the seizure, which I shall designate as a
"wealth effect," may occur as well. Table One credits Victim with
valuing his portfolio, after adjustment, at $2800 which means we as76. The wealth loss may cause the Victim to adjust by buying some inferior good, instead. So
long as the inferior good purchased is traded in markets as perfect as the market for Bezzts and
Gooclzes, however, that possibility does not affect the analysis.
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sume the rent values for his Bezzt ($800) and his Betr ($400) remain
the same after the loss as before. However, the very notion of a rent
incorporates an assumed contingency. Rents are determined by comparing present values of assets to their owners with their alternative
values in other possible circumstances such as their sale value in a
market or their value in some other use. 77
In the absence of any markets, the Victim holding the readjusted
portfolio would refuse any offers for either the Bezzt or the Betr ofless
than $1600 and $1200 respectively; but as long as potential offerors
can obtain Bezzts and Betrs in the market for $800, the prospect of
such offers actually being made is minimal. The contingency with
which we are concerned in a Murphian World is not the existence of
such unlikely future offers but instead the probability that losses will
continue.
If the vultures now seize the replacement Bezzt (the future state of
the world which, for bankruptcy purposes, we care about), Victim will
agree to take $800 from the market for the Betr so that the cash can be
used to replace the Bezzt a third time. Thus, in the only contingency
that counts, the seizure of the Bezzt not only reduces the value of the
portfolio by the amount of the market value of the least valued asset
but also potentially destroys the rent value of the least valued asset in
the remaining portfolio (or the next-to-the-least valued asset in the initial collection). The more likely it is that the Betr will have to be used
to preserve the value of the Bezzt, the more its value sinks from the ex
ante $1200 to a bankruptcy level of $800. This $400 additional loss is
the wealth effect which must be accounted for as a result of the vulture
raids.
While the Victim might say that he values his Betr at $1200, and
several swamis serving as expert witnesses might certify that he speaks
the truth, the loss of the Goodz took away any resources Victim could
use to demonstrate his willingness to pay for a new Betr. 78 If any fur77.
To be precise, an asset's quasi rent must always be qualified . . . . This is because there are
many alternative future states of the world that will reduce the market value of the asset in
its current use and simultaneously determine the character and value of its next best use.
More important, it is the value of the asset in its next best use under each specific contingency that determines the relevant quasi rent.
D.B. Johnsen, supra note 52, at 8-9; "In practice, moreover, all rents are quasi rents." Id. at 8
n.9.
78. If the Victim would not take $1200 for the Betr that remains in his portfolio, it can be
argued that the surplus or quasi-rent value remains. The decision to define surpluses in terms of
what he would pay instead is a conservative assumption in the context of this analysis, which is
made for two reasons. First, if demonstrable incentives exist for Victims to control their own
affairs under conservative assumptions, it is obvious that under the less restrictive premises, the
argument is even stronger. Second, to the extent that we conduct this analysis for the purposes
of eventually attempting to fashion legal rules, there is an additional reason for being conserva-
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ther losses occur, Victim will in fact be not only unwilling, but also
unable to replace the Betr. In an environment of continuing losses, it
is difficult to credit any claim that the Betr rent is worth anything to
him. In effect, the loss of the least valuable asset in the portfolio also
destroys the rents of the next-to-the-least valued asset. 79 Thus the
Bezzt raid cost Victim not only the market value of the Goodz which
was sold, but also the surplus value of the Betr.
This model illustrates two simple but very general points about the
dynamics of failure. First, as losses in wealth occur, Victims will attempt to minimize them by making portfolio adjustments in efforts to
reach optimal holdings. Second, because assets are indivisible, the
portfolio will not be liquidated proportionately. Portfolio adjustments
start with the liquidation of assets whose surplus, idiosyncratic, or specialized values to their owners are lowest relative to their market values. The assets that remain in portfolios after adjustment,
accordingly, tend to be those with the highest relative idiosyncratic or
specialized values to their owners. The more portfolios have been diminished by disaster, the less their market value explains why their
owners prize them. That is one reason why debtors who are insolvent
by a market measure are likely to be highly motivated to preserve the
assets they have left and thus unlikely to be passive when facing risks
of continuing losses.
The concentration of specialized or idiosyncratically valued assets
in portfolios reduced by losses need not result from the adjustment
decisions of wealth maximizing Victims alone, however. To the extent
that Victims do not have incentives to make adjustments, vultures
have incentives to seize the fungible assets, leaving the specialized ones
behind. Figure Two below shows why.
In this case, the Victim owns the same three assets. The previous
example, to simplify the analysis, equated the market prices for the
three assets. In this case for similar purposes, the value to the Victim
is the same for each of the assets ($1600) but the market prices varyas shown by the starred lines, with Bezzts fetching $800, Betrs $1200,
and Goodzes $1600. 80 A vulture seizure of any asset will not cause the
tive. Rules which credit people for valuing things beyond the extent that they can objectively
show invite claims of entitlements to things based on strategic overstatements of their supposed
values to the holders. Even Anti-Murphians concede this point. See, e.g., T. JACKSON, s11pra
note 18, at 126-27 (justifying the use of market values in bankruptcies, even though true subjective values are the relevant ones when attempting to predict and induce behavior by creating
legal rules).
79. This observation should be credited to O'Malley who formulated an early corollary stating that "Disasters are even worse than you imagine."
80. Just as we showed that for the portfolio in Figure One declining demand could make it
optimal, this portfolio can be optimal as well. The reason the Victim does not sell off a $1600
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FIGURE Two
THE INDIVISIBLE AssET PORTFOLIO -
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$1600
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Bezzt
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----------
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$1500
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******

$1200
$1100
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$900
$800

******

$700
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$0
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ASSET

Victim to make any post-raid portfolio readjustments. Just as before
· the raid the Victim would be indifferent to which asset was seized,
afterwards he is indifferent as between any of the possible combinations of two remaining assets. The Victim passivity induced by this
indifference does not justify any alarm, however.
Goodz to buy two $800 Bezzts is that a second and third Bezzt are each worth less than $800 to
him.
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When the Victim is apt to be passive, a vulture will prefer to seize
Goodzes first, and Betrs second. A Goodz can be traded for more of
the things the seizing vulture wants than can the Betr or Bezzt. Given
that a seizure is inevitable, the choice of which to seize will be optimal.
The vulture can benefit more by the appropriate selection without
making the Victim any worse off. Even when assets are indivisible, as
long as markets permit vultures to trade things they seize and Victims
to readjust their portfolios costlessly, losses are minimized whether it
is the Victim or the vultures who control the choice of assets to be
seized. The end result, which leaves the Victim's portfolio concentrated with more specialized and idiosyncratically valued assets, is the
same.

C. Loss Minimization with Indivisible Assets in Worlds of Imperfect
Markets or Expensive Conversion Techniques
Transaction costs create unhappiness. When access to markets is
costly, new preferences may arise about the order in which assets are
seized. Eventually, transaction costs will limit Victims' abilities to
make adjustments altogether.
1.

The Consequences of Asymmetrical Costs

The costs of converting Goodzes into Bezzts may differ as between
Victims and vultures. Suppose that vultures desire Goodzes not for
their taste, but rather for their market convertibility into gold. In
costly, imperfect markets, no Victim would expend resources converting his assets into a form preferred by vultures, but rather would
let the vultures do their own converting. But suppose that vultures
must use Goodz auctions held at courthouses for making the conversion and further that courthouse auctions fetch less gold per Goodz
than trades on the bullion market could net, but only for Victims. The
differential in conversion costs means that Victims will not, even in the
circumstances in Figure Two, be indifferent to which assets vultures
seize. To illustrate with numbers, suppose that Victim can get $1600
for a Goodz on the bullion market but that vultures can net only about
$1000 at an auction. If, just prior to the raid, the Victim makes the
conversion, he can satisfy the vultures' desire for a Goodz and have
$600 in gold left over.s1
81. This possibility may not have much utility in a world where vultures cannot be limited to
accepting the gold, of course, and in which the timing of their raids cannot be reasonably anticipated. When creditors' remedies are invented and vultures are converted into creditors, these
theoretical difficulties, as should be obvious, will be significantly ameliorated.
It will also be true that if vultures are superior liquidators in a regime where the profits from
that superiority must be shared with Victims, Victims will permit vultures to do the liquidating.
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To generalize, Victims will prefer to liquidate their own assets
when they have access to superior conversion techniques, and to delegate the task of liquidation to vultures when vultures have superior
access. Victims will tend to select first for liquidation those assets
which can be most cheaply converted. Vultures' welfare need not suffer if Victims act on those preferences. As Victims' fortunes decline,
the assets remaining in their portfolios will thus tend to be those which
are more costly for them to convert to other forms. There are good
reasons, which we shall soon explore, 82 why Victims may wish to hold
the extra gold gained by controlling the liquidation. The existence of
cost differentials in access to conversion techniques gives Victims incentives not to remain passive (indifferent about which of a collection
of equally valued assets the vultures may seize) and ultimately shapes
the character of the assets held in portfolios compressed by
misfortune.
2.

Transaction Costs as Constraints

Even when the conversions cost Victims and vultures the same,
those costs have other effects on Victims' incentives. Recall the original vulture seizure of our Victim's $1600 Bezzt from Figure One. If it
is costly to resort to markets, transaction costs will affect the sort of
adjustments that will be possible. At minimum, the total losses will be
increased by the cost of the adjustments. With indivisible assets, however, the point will eventually be reached on the slide toward poverty
at which there are constraints on adjustment which are more expensive than just the conversion costs themselves.
In Figure One above, 83 the possibility that access to markets can be
costly is shown by quoting dual prices for assets - bid prices which
owners can count on receiving, and asked prices which nonowners
must anticipate having to pay. 84 If assets are indivisible, the added
costs of conversion will make a simple asset-sale-and-repurchase portThus, were the vultures creditors here, and they rather than the victim could obtain $1600 by
sale of the Goodz, but had to be satisfied with $1000, the amount of the debt, Victim would
prefer that vultures handle the sale. In any case, it is likely that Victims will act to see that assets
are liquidated by the superior liquidator. The data supra note 2 indicates that debtors liquidate
their assets before they choose bankruptcy. Since they seldom seem to prefer permitting bankruptcy trustees to be liquidators, it is likely they doubt the supposed superiority of bankruptcy as
a liquidation process.
82. See infra section 111.D.
83. Figure One can be found between notes 74 and 75 supra.
84. The differences are presumably a function of the costs of marketing, whether they be in
the form of brokerage commissions, or rather in the losses from having capital tied up in unwanted assets for the period of waiting time needed to receive an optimum bid price, search costs
of locating a high enough bidder, and the like.
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folio adjustment impossible for t)le Victim; while he receives $700 on
the sale of his Goodz, it takes $800 to buy the replacement Bezzt so
that a market conversion is impossible. 85 The vulture loss remains at
$1600 and cannot be reduced by a one-step portfolio adjustment. The
Victim may choose to retain the post-prandial portfolio of a Betr and a
Goodz. On the other hand, he may choose to make a more substantial
adjustment by selling both the Betr and the Goodz, raising $1400 in
cash, and spending $800 of that cash to replace the Bezzt, leaving a
portfolio of a Bezzt and cash. The seizure and wealth losses using
both strategies are summarized in Table Two, below.
TABLE

Two

ADJUSTMENTS TO PORTFOLIOS OF INDIVISIBLE ASSETS
IN A WORLD OF IMPERFECT MARKETS

Asset
Bezzt
Betr
Goo dz

Original
Position

After
Loss

$1600
1200
800

1200
800

$140()86

600

Cash
Value to Victim
Market Value (Bid)

After
Adjustment

3600
2100

2000
1400

2000

130087

If transactions are costly, it eventually becomes impossible for Victims to minimize the impact of losses by resorting to markets. The
portfolio as it existed immediately after the vulture raid is worth to the
Victim exactly what the only available adjusted portfolio is worth to
him.
85. The possibility may have occurred to you that given these bid and asked prices, Victim
could locate an owner of a Bezzt who wants a Goodz and trade, thus apparently wiping out the
$100 assumed cost of access to the market. The sad truth is, however, that it may cost more than
$100 to locate and bargain with such an individual in the real Murphian world. A fellow Murphian who is a professional Aggie as well, Mike Pustay, suggested that I close this loophole.
86. The reason why the replacement Bezzt's value is $1400 instead of $1600 is explained by
the wealth effect and the requirement that values be objectively verifiable. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text. Since in the event of any future raids, the Victim's ability to do anything
with his portfolio is constrained by the market price for Bezzts plus the value of his cash, $1400
is all the wealth available to him to preserve his existing Bezzt or acquire a new model, even
though he would not sell one for less than $1600.
87. The possibility illustrated here that the market value of the portfolio after an adjustment
is actually reduced raises the prospect of a conflict between the welfare of Victims and that of
vultures. The general conditions for such conflicts and means of resolving them are discussed
below. See infra text accompanying note 98.
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D. Loss Minimization in a World with One
Well-Functioning Market

The risk of being disabled by transaction costs from making lossminimizing adjustments creates a desire to hold divisible and cheap-toconvert assets like gold and ultimately a demand for liquidity and
credit. Table Three shows what would have happened had the Victim
in Figure One held $800 in costlessly convertible gold or cash instead
of his Goodz which could be converted only at an adjustment expense
of $100.
TABLE THREE
ADJUSTMENTS TO PORTFOLIOS OF MIXED AsSETS IN A WORLD
WITH SOME WELL-FUNCTIONING MARKETS

Asset

Original
Position

After
Loss

Value to Victim
Market Value (Bid)

$1600
1200
800
3600
2100

1200
800
2000
1400

Bezzt
Betr
Cash

After
Adjustment

$1600
80088
2400
1400

Comparing Tables Two and Three, one can see that if even one
asset (like cash) can be nearly costlessly traded, optimal portfolio adjustments can still be made even in a world with mostly costly markets. By holding $800 in cash the Victim can reduce the potential loss
by $400 when, by holding a Goodz worth $800, he cannot. Indeed,
with only a small change in the numbers, the Victim's cash holdings
need not be even $800. Had the Victim holding three expensive-toconvert assets, as in Figure One, held in addition only $100 in cash, he
could have, at the cost of that $100 needed to buy access to the markets, made the same savings in adjusting his portfolio. In a world
without creditors' remedies, of course, when borrowing even a hundred dollars is impractical, he has no option but to keep his marginally
valued assets in cash.

E. Optimal Coping in Environments of Advanced Failure, in the
Absence of Markets

O'Flaherty's Fiat, "There is synergy in slippage," limits any strategy for protecting values in indivisible items by holding cheaply liquidated, divisible assets. One limit in a Murphian Universe is the
88. The reason why this number is $800 instead of $1200 is explained in supra note 86.
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certainty that vulture losses will continue. The protective liquid assets
will either be exhausted making portfolio readjustments, or will be directly consumed by vultures. (It is not only Victims who care about
the costs of resorting to markets. Vultures seizing cash can convert it.
into tastier items at lower cost than critters can be similarly converted,
so vultures will also tend to seize cash first.) 89
Inevitably, then, the Victim's holdings will be reduced to illiquid
assets. The specialization or idiosyncratic values of these assets are
likely to be so high, their market values probably so low, and the markets in which they are traded so expensive to enter, that the use of
markets as means of minimizing losses at this point can be disregarded. 90 Optimistically, presume that the two remaining assets are a
Bezzt and a Betr and, again for convenience, assume that their market
values are the same as in Figure One, to wit: $700 (bid). What other
strategies are available to a Victim bent on preserving the surplus values in those items?
Since their (net) market values are equal, the Victim has no reason
to believe that vultures are likely to seize the remaining items in any
particular order, so the probabilities of losing either asset in a future
raid are equal. If losses are to occur, Victim, left without any other
means to minimize their impact, has a definite preference that Betrs
rather than Bezzts go first. To restate the significance of this differential in Victim/vulture incentives, the absence of costless markets creates a strong desire in the Victim to control rather than leave to
chance the order in which vultures consume his indivisible assets.
Vultures are generally indifferent to the order.
There are obvious gains to be made by an agreement between Victims and vultures, that Betrs will be the appetizers, leaving Bezzts, if
they are to be eaten at all, left only for desserts. 91 Indivisibility, however, makes it difficult to find ways to share those gains. The law of
property which permits sales of fractionalized interests in specific indivisible assets, and borrowing which transfers a contingent interest in
unspecified property, both are obvious techniques for creating other
ways to share such gains. Unfortunately, both are impractical until
89. Thus, given the inevitability of seizure, vultures will, in optimal fashion as above, seize
from mixed portfolios containing liquid and illiquid assets, just those which Victims would
choose f'or them to seize.
90. There exist occasional minor possibilities that Betrs can, at some expenditure oflabor, be
trained to walk tightropes. The point is that markets are not the only process by which an asset
can be converted into another form. As long as the available nonmarket conversion techniques
are costly, however, the existence of such possibilities does not alter the above analysis.
91. The gains to be shared equal the rents saved in the Bezzt discounted by the probability
that it too may eventually be seized.
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after remedies are invented. (Once they are, however, grants of security interests, which are the equivalent of the sale of a fractional (contingent) property right, could be justified as efficient ways for Victims
to liquidate their own affairs. It would follow that bankrupts' estates
would be heavily weighted with encumbered assets. )92
Protective or insurance measures might reduce the probability of
future vulture raids. Victim's best strategy is first to take steps which
increase the probability that if disaster visits again, only the Betr will
be lost. Wealth maximizing strategies in .the fae<e of such risks include
hiding the Bezzt behind the Betr, preparing to offer the Betr up without a fight using it as a distraction, or disguising the Bezzt to look like
a lower-valued asset. Those activities, given the conundrum that there
is nothing better that can be done, are nevertheless desirable, even optimal behavior.93 They increase the probability that eventual disaster
will be minimized inasmuch as the vultures are indifferent about
which asset they seize, but the Victim has strong preferences which
can be satisfied if vultures are induced to choose Betrs before Bezzts.
Even these protective steps consume resources, however. Given
the indivisibility of Victim's assets, he has no such resources easily
available. He really has only two choices. One is to sacrifice the Betr
in exchange for cash or other divisible assets which can be protectively
deployed. If the probability of future vulture losses is very high, if the
costs of protective measures are low, and their efficacy is likely to be
high, he will make that choice. The lower the probability of eventual
loss, the more expensive and less effective the available protective
measures are, the more likely it is that the Vic~im will select the only
other option, which is to do nothing at all.
A decision to do nothing looks like passivity, but in circumstances
of extreme distress inertia can be optimal. Whether it is turns- on
whether there are open but unavailed-of opportunities worth taking to
redeploy or adjust the portfolio.94 As long as immediate loss is less
than certain, Victims have incentives to maximize the value of their
assets. Of course, with probabilities as high as ninety-nine percent (or
with the expected duration of even totally effective protective meas92. A recent empirical study indicates that this is the case. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J.
supra note 2, at 185-87, 306.
93. Even so, and for reasons that are not always easy to understand, some of these measures
fit into the category of bankruptcy crimes, which means that they are grounds for denials of a
discharge and possible ineligibility for certain other relief. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988)
(concealing property from a creditor is grounds for denial of a bankruptcy discharge).
94. The mere fact that we may, after the fact, speculate that there were some possible alternatives is ambiguous. Bounded rationality does not require that the Victim be perfect, only that he
try his best. After-the-fact discovery of roads not taken may confuse bounded rationality with
passivity.
WESrBROOK,
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ures down to a few minutes) the discounted expected value of his future portfolio is very low. Not many steps to preserve its value are
likely to be cheap enough to be worth taking. Given the indifference
of the Vultures, the choice we want the Victim to make is to do
nothing.
The intensity of the Victim's incentives to maximize the value of
his portfolio is a continuous rather than binary function of two variables: the probability that the last asset will be seized, and the expected timing of the seizure. Utter passivity occurs only in the
extreme case of certainty of immediate seizure when there is no possible action that can be taken by the Victim to affect either the order,
timing or the probability of the seizure losses. 9s If the probability of
seizure is less than total, or if the order or timing of the seizure is
uncertain, Victims have incentives to maximize their asset values. The
Common Pool justification for bankruptcy legislation is built on the
extreme case of absolute debtor certainty of immediate seizure of his
last asset. Until that point is reached, victims still have incentives to
react. While such incentives exist, there is no common pool problem.
There is some logic to the notion that the probability of seizure of
one's last asset by creditors is very low until the point of market insolvency is reached. At the insolvency point, however, it remains low.
Debtors would become certain that post-insolvency reactions cease to
be worthwhile only in a world which possesses a number of very unreal, non-Murphian features. Among them, at minimum, are: that all
creditors can costlessly determine exactly when the point of insolvency
is reached, that the odds of the insolvency being permanent are 100%,
and that creditors can costlessly and immediately exercise their right
to seizure. Because those assumptions fly in the face of Murphy's
Law, we can dismiss them. (Indeed, if Murphy's Law were invalid so
that those assumptions were true, all creditors acting on their own
would be fully paid from the proceeds of their perfect seizures anyway,
so we wouldn't ever have to worry about passing bankruptcy acts.
Collective proceedings would be unnecessary.)
95. Note that these conditions for passivity are exclusive, and "insolvency" per se is irrelevant. None of the conclusions reached above would change if vultures were turned into creditors
and Victims into debtors whose debts far exceed the value of their assets, but which do not
mature for 10 years. The insolvency as a source of passivity argument contains the unstated
assumption that under the current law of creditors' remedies, the more insolvent you are, and the
closer the time at which your debts mature, the higher the likelihood that creditors will end up
seizing your assets in the near future. There are, of course, other features of the real world that
also affect that probability, some of which are discussed below.
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F. Loss Minimization in a World Having Inedible
(Non-Property) Assets

The above conclusions assume everything of value in the world is
edible. Before abandoning that assumption, it is first necessary to
demonstrate that assets exist which are inedible in varying degrees.
Much wealth takes that form - which means that vultures really
aren't interested in everything Victims value.
1.

Port(folio)traits of Failures

Figure Three describes, in abstract terms, the wealth a typical Victim will seek to maximize. All his assets are put into boxes describing
characteristics of wealth that Victims and vultures may care about.
The southwest box is full of Things like Bezzts, Betrs, and Goodzes assets held in an illiquid form. Likewise, the southeast box contains
Things in which others have rights along with the Victim, like his
mortgaged house and joint bank account. All the contents of these
two boxes are designated "Property" which is a collection lawyer:'s
way of saying that a sheriff could get his hands on these Things, a fact
of some keen interest to creditors who might wish to employ sheriffs if
creditors' remedies are ever invented. As far as vultures are concerned, property is what is edible. Once sheriffs do become useful,
some property might be declared exempt from their clutches, i.e.,
made inedible by legislation. Inedibility can result, however, not only
from statutes, but also from the forces which underlie Murphy's Law.
The boxes on top illustrate that property is not all the Victim values. As he shifts his wealth from box to box, the debtor may buy steak
dinners or film for baby pictures. These assets - his leisure, his family, or any specialized asset that is useful to the Victim alone - I have
put into the northwest box.
The northeast box contains "nonproperty" that might interest vultures. The Victim may, for example, spend time and money cultivating his in-laws to increase the likelihood that should trouble come his
way, they would be willing to bail him out. Valuable expectancies like
these are assets to the Victim, but not the kind vultures could easily
seize (or sheriffs could easily capture should we ever invent creditors'
remedies).
Victims also hold a similar kind of wealth which I have put in the
same box but called "potential property." That term might have described the entire box. Two labels were used to illustrate that "potential property" assumes many different forms. I have in mind for the
subcategory of "potential property" assets like education, experience,
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FIGURE THREE
WEALTH IN MURPHY'S WORLD
THE VICTIM'S NON PROPERTY WEALTH

Wealth with Potential Market Value

Wealth having no
Market Value
(Consumption)

Valuable
Non-Property

'·'
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'·'

[Investment]

I
I
I
I
I
I
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of
Conversion
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I
I
I
I
I

I
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I
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--[Use]-->

(Exempt)
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<--[Use]--
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<-[Investment]-

(Non-Exempt)

(Exempt)
-[Investment]- >

(Non-Exempt)
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(Non-Exempt)
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I
I

Seizures
and Sales

Payments

I

I

J,

*

[Untangling-Action]

I

Seizures
and Sales

I

\If

VULTURES/CREDITORS

skill, ideas, half-completed plans or manuscripts, already acquired information or, in general, specialized prospects - all things worth investing in because someday the investment might be convertible into
cash. Another term which captures the flavor of these assets but
which has a bankruptcy ring might be "executory opportunities," or,
to use other jargon, "relational assets." 96 They share the characteris96. For discussion of the concept of how relationships can become assets, see, e.g., I. MAC·
NEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CoNTRAcr (1980); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
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tic that, from the vultures' standpoint, conversion from one form to
another can be done ollly by Victim cooperation. They might also be
called Victim-specific assets. Since their value is difficult to capitalize,
they cannot· be easily traded in markets.
A more accurate picture would show all the boxes as contiguous or
overlapping, with only very fuzzy lines distinguishing them. I drew
them with spaces in between for the various arrows, labeled in brackets, to show that the Victim can move his wealth from one box to
another. I added some cryptic indications of ways in which the moves
can be accomplished. Thus I show that the Victim can turn illiquid
and co-owned property into cash in several ways. He can use them
productively to earn cash. (I have in mind clipping coupons, or employment of a depreciating machine without making provisions to repair or replace it.) Those examples illustrate that the liquidate-by-use
technique may take considerable time before much cash is accumulated. Portfolio adjustments which take that form use markets, but
only indirectly or as part of a more complex hybrid market/
nonmarket conversion process. The Victim can also engage in a variety of more direct market transactions with his property assets, like
renting, mortgaging, or selling them. He can turn potential property
into cash by dint of future work or investment, employment of his
skills and experience, completing his plans, using his information, or
crawling to his in-laws.
The existence of inedible assets in our loss minimization model is
important for two reasons. First, debtors will seek to maximize the
values of the inedible assets in their portfolios just as they do for their
edible assets. Second, wealth can be transferred from one of those
forms to the other, which means that Victims can adjust their portfolios by investing in or liquidating inedible assets.
The desire to hold some cheap-to-convert assets like cash can now
be explained, even for a Victim in dire distress. Edible assets may be
necessary to finance the adjustments which are continually required to
maximize the value of his portfolio of inedible assets. It may take cash
to retain the love of a good mate, to realize on the goodwill generated
by an advertising campaign, or to obtain paybacks from investments in
specialized training for employees. It follows that Victims have an
interest in maximizing the values in their edible portfolios so long as
and to the extent that edible assets are required to finance adjustments
desired because of price, taste, technological, and wealth shocks to the
67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 139 (1989).
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equilibrium in their inedible asset portfolios. That is simply one more
reason to doubt that Victims will ever be completely passive.
By the same token, if some inedible assets are convertible into gold
that will satisfy vultures more cheaply than some edible assets can be
similarly converted, Victims have incentives to make such conversions. The existence of high surplus values and high conversion costs
for edible assets remaining in a portfolio gives vultures leverage to influence Victims to cooperate in making their inedible assets available
to fund future vulture feasts as well. A threat to seize your family
Bible if you do not seek a loan from your mother illustrates that
leverage.
2.

The External Effects of lnedibility

The existence of inedible assets in the Victim's portfolio at the
point of extreme failure adds an additional twist to his incentives. As
the probability of vulture seizures increases, the costs of protective
measures rise, or the efficacy of those available declines, the values of
the edible assets in Victim's portfolio become increasingly steeply discounted. 97 Since inedible assets cannot be grabbed, their values are
not discounted so steeply. At some point the worth to the Victim of
his least valued edible asset will thus drop below the value he places on
obtaining an additional inedible asset. He will therefore convert that
edible into the more highly desired inedible item. From the standpoint
of Victims facing the risks of holding edible assets, the conversion is
wealth maximizing. As long as it remains possible to hold inedible
assets, Victims have the incentive to make conversions until their estates no longer contain any edible assets. Consequently, empty edible
estates may not evidence passivity, but rather may result from wealth
maximization incentives in a world in which it is possible to hold assets in an inedible form and costly to hold them in edible form.
Such conversions may be suboptimal. While there have always
been conflicts of interest between Victims and vultures, as long as Victims retained assets vultures got fed; either they were likely to feed
themselves in the manner least harmful to Victims, or the Victims
were likely to be able to minimize the cost of adverse vulture menu
selections. Thus, given the Murphian inevitability that losses would
occur, we could nevertheless conclude that optimal resource allocation
97. See discussion in the text accompanying supra notes 77 and 78 showing that the loss of
one asset also destroys the surplus in the next-to-the-least-valued asset. The loss of edible assets
similarly reduces the rent values held in inedible assets if they are the next in line. In addition,
since the value of an asset is simply the discounted value of its future services, the prospect of a
shortened service life tends to diminish present value.
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obtained. Either Victims were indifferent to the manner in which vultures raided, or vultures were indifferent to the manner in which Victims responded, leaving losses minimized.
The vultures are not indifferent to the Victim's decision to convert
edibles into inedibles.98 It is thus impossible to conclude that such last
steps of the economically dying Victim are optimal. Such conversions
tend to maximize the Victim's wealth in the face of a world full of risk,
but they tend at the same time to reduce the welfare of vultures. The
conversions should then be hailed or regretted depending on whether
the gains to the Victims outweigh the losses to the vultures.
If the world were perfect enough, the behavior of the affected Victims and vultures would permit us to know whether the conversions
were worthwhile. If the losses to vultures were larger than the gains to
Victims, and the costs of transactions were zero, vultures jointly
would pay victims not to make the conversions. The fact that no offers to pay are made to any Victim thus would be evidence that the
benefits to Victims exceeded the losses to vultures.
In the Murphian world we have posited, the absence of such offers
is less comforting evidence. The costs of making such bargains, including the costs of organizing a joint enterprise among vultures,
rather than the absence of possible gains in aggregate welfare may explain why no vulture offers are forthcoming. Vultures who cannot enforce any such deals they might make (at least until creditors'
remedies are invented) either with each other or with Victims, may not
attempt to initiate the deals in the first place.
On the other hand, the costs to the vultures simply represent the
loss of benefits they formerly gained when Victims held edible assets.
The vultures never paid for those benefits in the first place. The benefits they lose, therefore, are "external." Since they do not obtain similar ·benefits when Victims decide to hold wealth in an inedible form,
they are forced to pay if they desire to maintain the' preexisting benefit
levels. Indeed, one reason a Victim might convert edibles into inedibles may be to exclude vultures from obtaining those unpaid-for
benefits in order to induce the vultures to pay.
Forcing vultures to pay for the benefits they receive tends to optimize aggregate welfare. If those who provide benefits to others do not
98. We have noted some other instances in which the Victim's actions to maximize his
wealth may reduce the welfare of vultures. See, e.g., supra note 87. To the extent that Victims
spend resources which reduce the likelihood of all vulture seizures by, for example, raising all
seizure costs, rather than simply influencing the order in which vultures are likely to choose to
seize assets, a similar conflict between Victim and vulture welfare exists as well. The arguments
made below concerning the conflicts created by the existence of inedible assets apply to these
other cases as well.

2138

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:2097

get paid for them, they are likely to engage in too little of the activity
that provides those benefits. It may be costly for vultures to organize
themselves to make such payments. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that conversions should be prevented in principle. The aggregate welfare lost by eliminating the power of Victims to induce
payments from vultures would have to be weighed against the net
losses suffered by reason of the vultures' inability to cooperate. The
above conclusions are formally expounded in the appendix to this paper, for readers familiar with standard economic geometry. The uncertainty about whether welfare can easily be optimized in a Murphian
world of transaction costs and inedible assets demonstrated here and
in the appendix, however, need not remain with us any longer than it
takes to invent nonbankruptcy creditors' remedies.
G. Loss Minimization in a World with Creditors
It has already been suggested that the existence of credit markets
permits a debtor to overcome some of the problems associated with
the indivisibility of assets, and thus to liquidate more efficiently and
adjust her inventory when losses occur. Once we adopt laws giving
remedies to creditors, we can drop the last of our idealistic, non-Murphian world assumptions and presume that instead of facing the risk
of asset seizures by vultures, the Victim faces creditors holding collection writs instead. It should be obvious from the assumption that vultures are rational that changing the identity of potential asset grabbers
from vultures into creditors does not change the analysis. Scavengers
are scavengers. Seizing creditors are likely to behave just as rational
vultures do, and Victims are likely to react to actual and impending
creditor seizures in the same way as they would to grabs made or
threatened by vultures.
Creditors differ from vultures in only three important respects,
none of which undercuts the conclusion that Victims are likely to be
the optimal liquidators of their own declining affairs. While Victims
may have been able to bargain with vultures about which assets should
be seized and when, Victims could not ensure that any negotiating
vulture could be legally bound not to raid. On the other hand, when
the seizure threat comes from a creditor, the creditor's entitlement to
seize is limited. He can collect no more than he is owed. What is
more, the seizure by any creditor can be prevented by simply paying
the debt or judgment. In an environment filled with creditors rather
than vultures, therefore, victims can take certain protective measures
with the assurance of avoiding seizures. The better ability to plan for
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dealing with creditors as opposed to vultures makes debtors more
rather than less efficient as liquidators.
The second principal difference between the threat of asset loss via
vulture and creditor raids comes in their timing. Just when creditors
are likely to seize assets can be anticipated by debtors. Debts typically
have known maturity dates. Of course, some debts can be incurred or
accelerated based on an event of default whose time of occurrence is
unpredictable. Even for those, however, the procedures which creditors must follow in order to obtain their collection writs take predictable amounts of time. Debtors who can anticipate the timing of the
taking are likely to be more effective liquidators than debtors who
must plan on being raided at random.
The third difference between vultures and creditors is the market
in which seized assets are converted by the taker. A collection writ
typically gives the debtor a pro rata release from the debt when the
asset seized is cash, whether taken from a money bag or collected from
a garnishee. All other assets, however, typically are required to be
liquidated at auction sales held in courthouses. 99 The relative infrequency with which courthouse auctions are used by commercial sellers
is powerful evidence that the auction market is not an efficient technique for turning assets into cash. Debtors likely have access to liquidation markets which are far superior to those available to seizing
creditors (at least for the first "sale"). Even were sheriff's sales not the
mandated means by which creditors liquidate assets, it seems reasonable to believe that as between debtors who chose to invest in and own
the particular assets seized, and creditors who merely finance them,
that debtors as a class likely have more information about conversion
markets, and lower costs in searching for buyers than creditors as a
class. Debtors would thus be better liquidators simply because of their
familiarity with the assets:
In short, the differences between vultures and creditors tend to
make debtors even better salvagers of their own misfortunes than they
would be in a world where the risk of loss came from vultures rather
than creditors. We have l(oted, however, one caveat concerning the
wisdom of a regime which permits debtors to liquidate themselves:
What of the instances in which the natural incentives for Victims to
adjust portfolios, protect their assets, or convert them into inedible
99. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 72
(2d ed. 1982). Note that while sheriffs' sales are usually required by the terms of most nonbankruptcy collection statutes, the requirement is not inevitable. It is at least conceivable that creditors' remedies could require creditors and sheriffs to resort to a more appropriate market. Cf.
u.c.c. § 9-504(3) (1972).
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form tend to reduce the welfare of creµitors? At minimum, the existence of such potential conflicts means that debtor welfare is not
strictly derivative of creditor welfare. What's good for creditors is not
always good for debtors. Such conflicts can be efficiently resolved only
consensually between debtors and their creditors.
Is it possible that the inability of creditors to act jointly in contracting around the potential conflicts of interest between themselves
collectively and the debtor nevertheless justifies adopting bankruptcy
law? Probably not. Creditors can act individually, at the time they
extend credit, and thus resolve those potential welfare conflicts with
their debtors.
The status of creditor most often arises from consensual relationships.100 The fact that such relationships exist gives good indication
that the costs of transacting between the relating parties are relatively
low. The problems created by potential conflicts of interest can be
anticipated and provided for in the credit contracts actually formed
between debtors and creditors. If the expected value to debtors of retaining the right to control the conversion of their assets is high, they
can be expected to bargain for the right to retain that control, and will
expect to pay their creditors for that right.
On the other hand, if there are assets which debtors think they are
likely not to want to convert (or if creditors are likely to be superior
liquidators of certain assets) and the value to some creditors of the
power to prevent conversions is high, debtors can be expected to grant
security interests to creditors in those assets. Creditors can expect to
pay for the right to veto debtors' proposals to transact with specific
assets by taking lower interest rates or by granting other favorable
terms in the contract providing for the secured transaction.
In summary, in a world with creditors having legal remedies, debtors are likely to retain the right to liquidate when it is efficient for
them to do so, and to convey that right to individual creditors when it
is not. Given the power to liquidate and distribute a portion of their
estate, they are not likely to remain passive in the face of losses but
instead are likely to exercise the power they bargained for. Left in
their bankruptcy estates will be the encumbered assets which they had
no power to liquidate and distribute, but those assets will benefit the
secured parties and not the general creditors. So long as debtors are
the superior liquidators of certain assets in their own estates they will
liquidate those assets themselves rather than turn the task over to a
100. Like other writers before me, see, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 18, at 177-78, I
ignore the substantial difficulties involved in resolving potential conflicts of interest by contract
for creditors like tort victims and tax collectors, whose claims arise nonconsensually.
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process which is less efficient. Since bankruptcy law is unlikely to affect the superior liquidating abilities of debtors, except in the occasional accidental case, it is never likely to produce anything but empty
bankruptcy estates.
IV.

THE MORAL OF THE MURPHIAN MAf\fDATE: BANKRUPTCY IS
SUBJECT TO MURPHY'S LAW

The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that we lack
any persuasive theory for why we have or ought to have bankruptcy
legislation. Legal explanations for bankruptcy policy are simply unexplanatory. The only systematic attempts to justify banlcruptcy law
which go beneath the conclusory legal explanations are also unconvincing. They implicitly ignore the possibility that debtors will react
to losses. They predict that creditors will make recoveries in bankruptcies when we can easily observe that creditors do not.
The reason why bankruptcy estates will be empty, and why the
"Creditors' Bargain" theorists were mistaken, is basically the same.
Debtors, as we have demonstrated, will react to threats of loss so long
as they have any power and opportunity to do so. 101 The theory developed here explains just how they can be expected to react. That, in
tum, explains the ways in which the character of debtors' portfolios
changes as losses continue, and, eventually, why debtors' estates are
likely to be valueless to creditors by the time bankruptcy occurs.
The source of debtors' powers to react resides in the property
rights they have in their assets. So long as we permit private property,
which includes entitling property owners to transact with their property, the power exists for them to react to the threat of losses in the
ways described above. The theory developed in this study demonstrates the utility of permitting such transactions: debtors will use that
entitlement either to minimize the impact of losses, without harming
their creditors, or to pay creditors in advance for any harm creditors
may suffer by the exercise of that power. In that sense, the private
property system tends to induce optimal ioss minimization in a world
which contains risks that losses might occur. It also follows that if we
wish to change the behavior of debtors in ways which better ensure
101. We do not, for example, consider our private property to be a common pool when
looked at from the standpoint of the thieves who may take it from us. We have the ability to
react to threatened thievery. The possible actions available to debtors to react to threats by
creditors may be more limited than the set of entitlements owners have to react to threatening
thieves. By the same token, however, the legal strategies available to creditors pursuing their
claims are more limited than the strategies which thieves, who are less affected by legal trifles,
may consider and adopt. The point is the same, however. If there is an owner of the assets who
can react, there is no common pool problem.
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that creditors will always get paid in full in bankruptcies, tinkering
with the bankruptcy act itself is likely to be unproductive. What
would be required to achieve such an ideal is, instead, a drastic constriction of the number and scope of the rights which we grant owners
under our law of property.
Even when permitting debtors to self-liquidate generates welfare
conflicts between debtors and creditors, there is no theoretical point at
which we can say overall welfare would be enhanced by making a
change to collective control. Because those welfare conflicts potentially exist, a bargain theory which justifies bankruptcy law must posit
a bargain to which the debtor is a party. Real debtors, however, are
parties to real credit contracts with real creditors. If there are potential welfare conflicts between debtors and creditors, there i~ no reason
to believe that the existing credit contracts do not resolve them. Creditors might agree to take the risk that the debtor will liquidate her own
property and adjust the price of credit accordingly, or they may eliminate the debtor's ability to control her affairs by taking real rights in
the debtor's assets and thus prohibit the debtor from transacting in
those assets. In short, there are good theoretical reasons, grounded in
conventional economic assumptions, for believing that debtors are apt
to be efficient liquidators when they are facing failure. Their creditors
have been paid for the risk that losses will result from the contract
term that permits debtors to liquidate their unencumbered assets, and
debtors, in turn, have taken the risk that their encumbered assets will
be unavailable for use in making portfolio adjustments when losses
occur.
Indeed, the efficiency of permitting the debtor to control the liquidation of her own affairs even explains the shape of the common creditor's remedy, which permits the debtor to foresee the time at which
seizure may occur and to employ any of her assets to satisfy or refinance maturing obligations. The secured transaction, which limits the
ability of the debtor to deal with the assets which collateralize the debt
without first paying off or obtaining consent of the creditor, is the unusual credit term. Debtors usually want as much discretion as possible
in dealing with their assets and are presumably willing to pay many of
their creditors to give them that discretion. That is the import of being unsecured. So long as Victims will bargain for the right to liquidate themselves and our law of property permits them to make such
bargains, it is likely that empty bankruptcy estates will always be a
feature of bankruptcy. No amount of tinkering is likely to change that
fact.
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Whither Murphian Economic Theory: An Introduction to
Murphian Bankruptcy Distributions

The proponents of pro rata bankruptcy distribution erred by mistakenly assuming that debtors will fail to maximize the value of their
portfolios so that a collective system is necess_ary to maximize it for
them and their creditors. Their analysis goes astray for another simple
reason: it is focussed on optimizing the wrong variable. The "common-pool" analysis is premised on the unspoken assumption that if
the market value of the debtor's estate is maximized everything will be
hunky dory. Efficient bankruptcy policy would seek not to maximize
the value of debtors' estates, but rather to minimize bankruptcy
losses. 102
Those two quanta differ in three essential respects. The manner of
distribution itself influences the size of the loss. First, debtors must
experience some gains by choosing to distribute on a non-pro rata basis. Otherwise, there would be no need for bankruptcy law to force a
change in that natural behavior. The pro rata requirement eliminates
those gains, increasing the value of the bankruptcy losses borne by
debtors, even those who maximize the aggregate market value of their
distributions. Second, if losses are to be minimized, not only must the
value of what is distributed be maximized but also the distribution of
the assets must be made first to those who value getting paid the most
and last to those who value avoiding losses the least. Third, the costs
of making the distribution must also be minimized. A pro rata
formula will achieve the first two goals only in a highly unlikely world
in which all creditors are clones103 so that the value the debtor places
on satisfying each, and the value each places on losses, are identical.
By the same token, except in a freak world where all creditors are
equally efficient collectors, a pro rata distribution scheme will negate
the social benefits which result from a system that rewards most those
creditors who are capable of effecting low-cost transfers of the debtor's
assets to themselves. In a real Murphian world, of course, real debtors
do have preferences, and real creditors differ in the values they place
on losses and in their relative skills of effecting low-cost transfers.
A complete Murphian theory would show that non-pro rata distributions of debtors' assets that occur in the real Murphian world tend
102. It should be obvious by now that focussing on asset value maximization instead of loss
minimization is a classic blind spot typical of those who are unfamiliar with Murphian
philosophy.
103. Note that some writers in the classical tradition which existed before the introduction of
Critical Murphian Studies do make this assumption. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing the homogeneity of creditors).
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to approach the loss minimizing ideal. There are certainly impressionistic reasons for believing that permitting debtors to control the distribution of their assets would tend toward the optimal. In the
vernacular of the initial parable, Victims are apt to feed their favorite
vulture first. The hungriest vultures are, ceteris paribus, likely to expend greater efforts in staging raids on the Victim's assets, the satiated
ones less so. In a like manner, vultures whose costs of raiding are
lowest will get more to eat from a given Victim's assets than those who
are less efficient raiders, so that the costs of transfers from Victims to
vultures are also likely to be minimized. A complete proof that debtors are likely to be the most efficient distributors as well as the most
efficient liquidators of their own estates is beyond the scope of this
study. It is obvious, however, that pro rata distribution of the sort
envisioned by classic bankruptcy law would achieve none of those distributional gains. That may further explain why actual distributions
occur outside of bankruptcy leaving nothing to be qistributed when
the proceedings occur. If there were anything left to be distributed
pro rata, the world would be worse off if it were done under the classic
pro rata scheme.
Among other problems that such a showing would have to solve is
what Alan Schwartz has called "The Continuing Puzzle of Secured
Debt." 104 Why a debtor's distributional decisions made at the time of
the initial extension of credit are likely to be efficient is something that
we currently do not well understand. Work is already underway in
the Murphian Community on those problems, however. The Murphian Asset Management Theory has already revealed that debtors
have significant preferences for the order in which creditors can seize
assets. That leads naturally to a theory of secured debt as an efficient
means for debtors to influence the risk that assets will be seized in
suboptimal sequences. Once Critical Murphian Theory becomes a recognized discipline, the intellectual obstacles standing in the way of a
rigorous showing that the debtor is not only the most efficient liquidator but also the most efficient distributor of his assets will surely be
overcome. When that work is complete, any remaining doubt that
classic bankruptcy law (as we have initially defined it) can be justified
on economic grounds should be eliminated. The possibility remains,
despite suggestions to the contrary, 105 that another sort of bankruptcy
regime, one in which debtors do have the power to make the liquidation and distribution decisions, could replace the classic version which
104. Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984).
105. See, e.g., T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 209-24; Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1985).
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we have considered here. Optimists might see the current reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, which do give limited effect to
the desires of debtors on the questions of what will become of their
assets, and who will share in them, as the first hesitant steps along the
path to develop an optimal creditors' remedy system to deal with financial disasters.
B. Principles of Murphian Politics -

An Afterword

Murphian theory proves that collective control over the liquidation and distribution of debtors' assets is unnecessary if we are interested in optimal liquidations. The question remains: Why then .do we
have bankruptcy law? Why do we wish to entrust liquidation and distribution decisions to those who will make them in ways which harm
rather than enhance aggregate welfare? The interests of those who get
to make the decisions (the butchers and their helpers) are of course
clear enough, but why would those they are supposed to serve (who
generally get nothing from the services being provided) ever agree to
hire them? Not surprisingly, Murphian theory has an answer to those
questions as well.
The impulse to have bankruptcy law and to tinker with it after we
have it comes not from notions of "equality" or "efficiency" but rather
from wishful thinking. We are doomed because we harbor hope, a
specific belief in alchemy: that if we are only clever enough, gold can
be squeezed from turnips. Our fatal wish is for a world in which disasters don't occur. We don't really care if anybody gets paid "equally"
or paid "efficiently." What we really want is a world in which they get
paid. Period.
Our commitment to the proposition that everybody should get
paid grows from our belief that their claims are worthy. We are offended if promises upon which we rely aren't performed, if injuries go
uncompensated. At least since the abolition of debtors' prisons, however, we have also adopted a regime in which our commitment to enforce worthy claims is limited to extractions of money. Laws which
enforce contract, tort, and property obligations are effective only
against those who have monetizable wealth. The poor are free to commit their torts, breach their contracts, ignore their duties. Among
those poor are our bankrupts.
When someone doesn't get paid, we are forced to confront just
how weak the law really is. That gives rise to the illusion that if only
the law were stronger, our basic values could be vindicated. The law
grows from essentially political roots, and we have much faith in politics, both electoral and judicial. In particular, bankruptcy is the crea-
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tion of Congresses and Parliaments. Members of Parliament and of
Congress are likely to respond to the pleas of their constituents who do
not get paid. 106 Those who do get paid are unlikely to take much
interest in bankruptcy legislation. It is thus easy to understand why
such legislation exists. 101 Even the complaining unpaid constituents,
however, may be unwilling to agree to wholesale reductions in the
rights they possess to transact in their own property. It follows that
the legislation they demand is likely to leave their own basic property
rights intact, and, consequently, is unlikely ever to gain for them what
they desire.
Bankruptcy law is a symbol of our faith that wealth can be created
by voting, lobbying, and litigating. We sometimes overlook the Murphian possibility that wealth can also be destroyed by the same means.
What is hardest to accept, however, is that sometimes law is likely
neither to create nor to destroy much wealth. The core insight of
Murphy's Law is not that the world is necessarily an inevitably unhappy place. Murphy's point was actually both more potent and more
subtle. Expending the effort required to make the world happier tends
to make us unhappier. We can credit ourselves with the happiness
that results from honest effort in trying to improve the world by tinkering with bankruptcy law and, fortunately, we can't do much damage. Until we are ready to abandon the institution of private property,
however, we won't accomplish much either.
106. There is some evidence, for example, that bankruptcy legislation in this country resulted
from the fears of distant creditors that most recoveries from bankrupt debtors would be made by
creditors who lived nearby (and, presumably for that reason, were more efficient collectors). See
Weisberg, supra note 12.
107. The Johnsen Judgment referred to in supra note 9 elaborates on this explanation.
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APPENDIX

Graph One below illustrates the position of the vultures as bearers
of the external costs of Victim's activities as Victims choose to convert
their edible assets into inedible form. Because the welfare conflicts
illustrated here occur whether or not the assets involved are divisible
or indivisible, the functions shown are drawn in the customary form
which assumes divisibility. (Stairstep shaped curves which describe
the demand for lumpy assets yield similar, if less discrete, results.)
Curves DDJ, DD2, and DD3 represent the Victim's demands at
three times for any edible good, say, Gadgets. As his assets are eaten,
his ability to pay and therefore the rents in his existing inventory of
Gadgets decline, a feature illustrated by the downward shifts in his
demand over the course of two vulture raids. Because in a world in
which assets are not perfectly divisible the remaining wealth tends to
be more highly concentrated in specialized or idiosyncratically valued
goods and some demand for Gadgets remains, we suppose that Gadgets are specialized or uniquely valued. The downward shifts are also
accompanied by a steepening effect to illustrate that the demand for
whatever remains tends to become increasingly inelastic. 108
Curve CD represents the marginal opportunity cost to the Victim
of holding Gadgets, which is itself a function of two determinates:
how much he values the other assets in his inventory which he would
have to give up in order to acquire more Gadgets, and the costs of
converting those other assets into Gadgets should he ever decide to do
so. If the market conversion costs remain' relatively constant but, as
his total wealth declines his demand for his remaining assets declines
along with it, his cost of holding Gadgets also increases; thus CD is
shown having a positive slope, depicting lower costs of holding Gadgets at lower levels of wealth.
DC shows the amount vultures would be willing to pay to ensure
that Victim kept varying stocks of edible assets for them to snack on,
108. Elasticity is simply a measure of responsiveness of demand. It measures how much the
amount demanded will change if the price changes. When demand is elastic, small price changes
have big effects on the quantity demanded. When it is inelastic, the amount demanded changes
very little as price fluctuates. The reasons for concluding that the demand of Victims in distress
for the goods they already hold becomes increasingly inelastic relate to the changing character of
the victim's portfolio as his wealth declines. The tendency of the assets which remain to be of the
more specialized or idiosyncratically valued variety noted in the discussion above, see supra text
following note 79, means satisfactory substitutes for them are less likely to be easily available in
the market or elsewhere. Demand for goods that have easily available, satisfactory substitutes
tends to be elastic. Demand for goods that don't tends to be more inelastic. In addition, the
reduced portfolio is more likely to be highly concentrated with goods regarded by the Victim as
"necessities." Demand for necessities tends to be more inelastic than demand for luxuries. See,
e.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 52, at 130-31.
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GRAPH ONE
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measured in terms of Gadgets. At high inventory levels, Victim keeps
more Gadgets and equivalents than vultures anticipate ever wanting to
eat - in other words, they can get full on Q2 Gadget-equivalents. At
inventory levels below Q2, however, they face some prospect of going
hungry and would be willing to give up something to avoid that prospect. Thus, the total welfare gains experienced by vultures from Victim's decision to hold Gadgets and other edible assets are represented
by the area under DC. 109
109. That vultures can be external beneficiaries of Victims' wealth is a consequence of the
economic weakness of the Victims' legal entitlements to their assets. Property law gives you a
right to exclude others from the benefits of your activity. It does not, however, necessarily give
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Now suppose when the Victim's taste for Gadgets is represented
by DDI, his Bezzt is taken. The drop in his total wealth reduces his
desire for Gadgets to the level shown by DD2. The optimal number of
Gadgets to hold will accordingly drop from QI to Q2. In order to
recover the welfare loss of now holding more Gadgets and fewer
Bezzts than he really wants (equal to the area of triangle F) Victim
will sell off QI - Q2 Gadgets and reinvest the proceeds in a replacement Bezzt. The portfolio adjustment benefits Victim by the value of
F. (F is how much the Victim would prefer holding a replacement
Bezzt instead of Ql - Q2 Gadgets.) As long as he continues to hold at
least Q2 Gadgets and equivalents, however, the vultures are indifferent
to his decision to liquidate Gadgets. If Gadgets and Bezzts are viewed
as close substitutes by vultures, they may either be indifferent, or even
applaud the decision to add another Bezzt.
When, however, at the reduced DD2 level of wealth, the vultures
make an additional Bezzt raid, Victim's desire for Gadgets will decline
still further to DD3. Part of the decline is attributable to the additional wealth lost. Part may also result from the discounting of value
of Gadgets resulting from the increasing probability that vultures may
start to eat them up as well. By now, however, the possibility of raids
on any other edible assets makes it unattractive to adjust by investing
in them. The desire to acquire the next most valued inedible asset may
now exceed the desire to acquire an additional Gadget so that loss
minimization is possible by converting the now excess Gadgets into
inedible assets. As a result, Victim will sell off Q2 - Q3 Gadgets, making himself better off by the amount of triangle G, which is, in effect,
the rents gained from owning the new inedible asset. Unlike the aftermath of the first adjustment, however, vultures are no longer indifferent. They experience no gain from the acquisition of the replacement
inedible asset, and the drop in Gadget holdings erodes their welfare by
an amount equal to triangle H.
Whether in the aggregate. the welfare gains by Victims from portfolio adjustments, which redu,ce their inventories of any edible asset beyou a cheap way to accomplish that exclusion. If you want a grand piano and you know that it
will make your mother happy if you have one, the only practical way of excluding her from that
happiness in order to induce her to pay you for her pleasure is to forgo getting the piano in the
first place, which means that you must risk the entire rent value of the piano.
Until credit contracts become enforceable, it is difficult for Victims to obtain agreements from
vultures to pay for the benefits in any case, although as we shall see later, once vultures become
creditors the existence of credit markets may result in having those benefits paid for. If credit
contracts actually exist in which debtors promise creditors to maintain specified levels of net
worth, or loan-to-value ratios for collateral, there is empirical reason to believe that creditors
actually pay for such assurances in the real world. The current Bankruptcy Code has no provisions giving priority to creditors who make such payments over those who apparently do not.
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low the level of Q2, outweigh the losses to vultures depends on the
likelihood that H < G. That will, in turn, depend on the relative
shapes of DD3 and DC. Note that as Victim's demand becomes more
inelastic, the area of G tends to increase, and the same relationship
exists between the area in H and the inelasticity of DC. To digress for
a moment, if vultures were well diversified creditors and Victims were
strapped debtors, there are reasons to believe that any single Victim's
demand will be less elastic than the aggregate demand of many Vultures, 110 a fact which would justify permitting Victims to do with their
assets what they want, and place the burden on the vultures to pay the
appropriate Coasian bribes 111 in order to induce maintenance of optimal inventory levels of Gadgets.
The fact that welfare conflicts potentially exist between vultures
and Victims means that Victim's interests are not wholly derivative of
the vultures' welfare. If vultures were creditors, and creditors' remedies were invented, one might anticipate that some creditors would
pay the bribes by taking security interests. Others, of course, might
decide not to, in which case they take the risk of remaining unsecured.
In other words, once the law enforces creditors' claims, there is reason
to hope that any welfare conflicts which exist between debtors and
creditors could be resolved in their ex ante credit contracts.

110. If a drop in price causes me to purchase an additional Bezzt, and the same drop induces
you to purchase an additional Bezzt, it is easy to see that our aggregate response to the price
change is greater than the response of either one of us looked at alone. Generally, the greater the
responsiveness of demand, the more elastic we say it is. That is why aggregate or market demand
curves are more responsive (elastic) than individual demand curves.
111. See Coase, supra note 71.

